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Norms, Values, and the Social Sciences

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Foreword

In this article we are concerned with the function of the social sciences. Our main thesis will be that the social scientists should be concerned with situations in which there are conflicts of norms and that norms, or moral rules of behavior, are quite different from technological skills or from natural laws. Norms are conventional but, nevertheless, quite necessary for cooperation in arriving at desired ends. We shall contend, also, that norms cannot be reached in the same manner as are purely technical ways of doing things, for norms concern the harmony of ends and they involve choice of ends and desired ends. We are assuming that the social sciences, as we conceive of them, can function in a political democratic framework only.

Introduction

An act may be organized before it is carried out in fact. To organize an act means to order it not only with reference to the immediate environment necessary for executing it, but also with reference to the final stage of the act. To organize an act, then, means to plan it with reference to its future consequences. If one takes into consideration not only the immediate end which the act is designed to achieve, but also possible mediate consequences, then he is planning the act with reference to a more general principle (or principles). These more general principles are called "norms." Norms are formulated for the purpose of (1) securing harmonious ends (goals, values), and (2) assuring the harmony of ends to be achieved. A norm may be a principle—an ethical principle—but it is a different kind of principle than is formulated by scientists when they are confining their statements to unalterable relationships in nature. The principle of the lever states how things, under specified conditions, will behave inevitably. Such a principle is concerned with what of necessity was, is, or will be, but not with what *ought to be*, or, in our terminology, with what might better be. Many scientists, especially "natural" scientists, do not care whether an experiment gives this

particular end or that. Social scientists should be concerned with the harmony of ends, and as far as I know, there is no law or principle according to which we can arrive at or deduce the norms which, if applied in achieving ends, would guarantee a harmony of these ends.

Values are ends or goals which are integrated with other desired ends or goals. Such things as books, tables, music, fishing, hunting, eating, etc., may be values. If these and other things are values, it is because they are desired *and* because they have been compared or *evaluated* with respect to each other. This means that they are ordered with respect to each other and that they belong to a system. Values, then, may be thought of as ends that have been systematized and are believed to be in harmony with each other. Once we accept a few ends as basic, such as life, liberty, property, the pursuit of happiness, friendship, etc., it becomes much easier to evaluate other ends. Of course, no end need remain fixed in a system, but the entire system of values cannot be changed all at once. In practice we change one or more values (or deny that they are good) by appeal to their inconsistency (disharmony) with other universally accepted values, i. e., universal with respect to a group of persons.

Albeit values and norms are correlative terms, they are, nevertheless, distinguishable, even as ends and means are distinguishable. Norms do not refer to ends directly but refer directly to the means of acquiring ends, and they specify the moral form, as over against the technical form, of a particular means of acquiring a particular end. Norms do not concern directly the technical aspect of the means. That is left to the pure research scientist and the technician. Norms are concerned, rather, with that aspect of the means which will have its effects and repercussions on mediate ends. They are concerned with behavior insofar as that behavior, which is designed especially to reach a particular, immediate end, affects the attainment of desirable and undesirable mediate ends. Hence norms always involve the coordination of desirable ends, and when such ends are integrated and coordinated, they are said to be values. It is desirability which finally makes the distinction between a norm and the technique of accomplishing a goal. The purpose of a norm is to inform us how it is possible to apply technology in achieving a certain end without interfering with the achievement of other desirable ends. But it informs us also that if a specific end cannot be achieved without interfering with the achievement of certain desired ends, then there is no rational defence for achieving that end. Here we see that if one is to defend his belief that a certain end is good, he must show that it is not inharmonious with other generally accepted ends (or values), and if he is to defend his behavior in reaching that end, he must show that such behavior is not inconsistent with established norms. Thus,

starting with generally accepted ends and norms as the basis for argument, one can argue that his end is *good* and that his way of achieving it is *moral*. Neither the generally accepted ends, nor the norms, prescribe our particular ends or the particular (technical) way of achieving these ends. It is assumed, rather, that there are many alternative possible achievable ends, many of which are consistent with our basic values, and that there are many alternative possible ways of achieving ends, many of which are consistent with accepted norms. A norm functions in a secondary sense as a basis for evaluating ends, but it is used primarily as a basis for evaluating the specific form of behavior necessary as a part of the means of achieving a *certain* end.

An end may be bad in itself unrelated to other ends or it may be bad, not in itself, but because it precludes the achievement of certain other ends. That it is bad in itself is not deducible from norms. An end is bad, as judged by the norms, only if it conflicts with the achievement of desired ends; i. e., good ends. Similarly, an end is good as judged by norms only if it is instrumental in leading to other desired ends. And here we see that there are two levels of bad ends and two levels of good ends. The first level of bad ends comprise those ends not judged by norms and not, therefore, systematically related to other ends. It takes no norm to conclude that a taste of turpentine is bad. The second level of bad ends comprise those ends judged by norms to conflict with desired ends. Similarly, the first level of good ends comprises those ends not judged by nor deducible from norms. They are good, therefore, as unrelated to other ends. The second level of good ends are those judged by norms to be good, and they are good because they are related to a system of goods or ends and are judged to be conducive to the attainment of other ends.

Institutions, Values, and Norms

In this discussion we are interested primarily in norms and secondarily in the correlative components of norms, namely, values and institutions. Can there be a science by which we can determine the norms to be followed in applying our technical knowledge toward the achievement of specific ends or values? Or, can the social sciences prescribe the norms for society? My thesis is that science is not a direct way of arriving at norms. Although a wise person will use scientific information in formulating norms, he cannot, by the very nature of norms, exclude a consideration of ends and the harmony of ends in formulating norms. And since scientific information is of itself devoid of a consideration of ends, it is obvious that we cannot go directly from science to norms. Rather science must be considered a means to ends, and in a free society it must remain subservient to human purposes. Not only is it impossible

in a democracy for scientists to prescribe norms but it is impossible to arrive at them through *a priori* methods. Neither can we learn *how* men might better behave by reference alone to how they behave in fact. Our task is to show the place of social science in the formulation of norms.

Sumner says every institution is characterized essentially by its *idea* and its *structure*. Or, every institution has both goals, or a set of values, and norms which control behavior as men work toward those goals. When an institution has been established, certain values become social and certain prescribed practices are proposed as universal with reference to a particular society. Here we should not confuse technical means with norms. The scientist may state the technical means of accomplishing a particular kind of end, but as a scientist, he can say nothing directly about the desirability of that consequence, nor does he say anything about the implications of that consequence for other ends. Neither the pure scientist nor the pure technician, if such there be, is concerned with value judgments concerning ends as ends, or with norms.¹

Ends and values are not dictated by science. Rather science in a free society must lend itself to the accomplishment of ends freely chosen by the citizen. Our political freedom is a guarantee against the possible dictatorship of *scientists*, not science. Science, or scientific information is neutral with reference to ends, but citizens, including scientists, are not.

The conflicts in the contemporary world are not basically conflicts of values, but, rather, conflicts of norms. As a rule, men speak loosely and say that if we had the same values or if our scale of values were the same, there would be no conflict. But if all of us evaluated things the same so that each wanted the same kinds of things as every other wanted, that would not insure us against a conflict in attaining those things. Often we are led to believe that other persons and other nations want bad, evil, debasing things, and that if we could but convince them to want good, upright, or even "spiritual" things, we would have peace and cooperation. Nothing could be farther from the truth. If others should want precisely what we do not want, then there would be no conflict, and possibly no cooperation. Which means that it is because we *do* want the same kinds of things and often the same thing, that there exists the basis for conflict.

¹A pure scientist tries to state information in such a way that it is indifferent to being applied for particular ends, and, therefore, he does not specify the end or ends to which pure science statements (basic or neutral knowledge) may be applied. A technician may state the relationship between means and particular, specified ends, but he does not pass value judgments on ends as such. He may go so far as to say, *m* is better than *m'* as a means to a specified end, but he does not evaluate ends.

It is not wrong for two different persons to want the same piece of property. What may be wrong, however, is the method by which they try to get that property. Our conflict with Russia consists of a conflict of the norms or principles from which we and they operate. We want bread; so do they. Apparently both we and they want to industrialize our country; we like the results of machinery, the pleasure of automobiles, good music, painting, sculpturing, as well as the fruits of science in general. It would be absurd to say that we like spiritual things (or have spiritual values) and the Russians do not. If it were as simple as that, there would be no conflict, for we could have all the spiritual values and be satisfied, since Russia would want none. The conflict is over the principles to be followed in attaining those ends. It is impossible to do away with the stubborn fact that often different people want the same things or the same kinds of things. However, in attaining these things we can operate from the same set of norms.

Social Problems versus Technical Problems

I would like to propose here that social problems are clearly distinguishable from *technical* problems, and that all social problems emerge, not out of a conflict of values, but out of a conflict of norms. As a corollary, the solution of any social problem consists in resolving the conflict in norms. This may be done by establishing a new norm or by accepting one of the old norms and rejecting the others, or by a compromise on particular points where the two or more norms conflict.

To illustrate what is meant by a conflict in norms, suppose certain people in a community, despite the fact that they dislike typhoid fever and would like to get rid of it, nevertheless are opposed on religious grounds (and politics defends their religious rights) to being vaccinated, whereas others of the community believe it is proper to eliminate that disease by vaccination. Here we have different persons acting from different norms, and in that case the realization of the commonly accepted goal—good health—is precluded because of that conflict. If, however, the scientist successfully argues that vaccination is not contrary to the will of God, or if the theologian convinces the members of the community that science is contrary to the will of God, then the conflict in norms is resolved and the social problem disappears.

Again, two economic systems may be in conflict, such as communism and capitalism, and in that case the goods acquired or distributed in accordance with one system will be said by those who believe in the other system not to be distributed and acquired *justly* and *equitably*. Also, an individual may be trying to act on the basis of conflicting norms. In such cases there are conflicting attitudes within a single individual,

and the result may be some sort of conflict to be dealt with by a psychiatrist or by a psychoanalyst.

If there were no conflict of norms there would be no social problems. All problems then would be technical. In distinguishing between social problems and other kinds of problems treated in science, we may say that pure science is concerned with general laws and principles without direct reference to the particular ends to which they may be applied. Technology is concerned with the application of pure science statements to particular ends without reference to norms or to the desirability of these ends. Neither the pure scientist nor the technician is concerned with the evaluation of ends. Their value judgments are confined to means-end relationships. The social scientist is concerned with problems emerging out of a conflict of norms; that is, out of behavior, whether of a single individual or a group of individuals, which precludes the achievement of mediate desired ends, or which precludes the harmony of ends.

Is There a Science for Determining Norms and Values?

Every science must have some principle or principles at its roots. A set of principles in any science must enable us to both explain and predict phenomena. Presumably the principles of mechanics enable us to explain and predict such events as the eclipse of the moon, the tides, etc. And if we were successful in formulating a set of principles by which we could determine the proper direction and goals of society, or, which is the same thing, by which we could determine what we ought to want and how we ought to behave in fulfilling those wants, then we could use these principles deductively, and only the logician, not the preacher, would be in demand. Apparently most social scientists are agreed that we cannot arrive at the ways in which we ought to behave by pure reason nor yet by revelation. And it seems quite obvious to me that we cannot arrive at social normative principles directly by stating the results of a study of the *status quo*. We commit the cultural fallacy^{*} in believing that the principles from which we judge that behavior is good or bad are derived directly from social phenomena and the facts. Although one can derive the law of falling bodies directly by observing falling bodies, and although one can *state* the social practices, both good and bad, moral and immoral, one cannot on the basis of facts alone arrive at a statement of what we should have done yesterday or what

^{*}"Cultural fallacy" means identifying "right" and "wrong", and "moral" and "immoral" with the actual practices of people in a culture. One who commits the cultural fallacy fails to distinguish between the purpose of an act and the act itself, or between *idea* and *structure*, *norm* and *value*. See *The Logic of the Sciences and the Humanities*, Chapter XXI, by F. S. C. Northrop.

we might better do tomorrow. What, then, is the source of the principles by which we judge that what we are about to do is right or wrong? Of one thing we are certain. In order to cooperate with others effectively, peaceably and intelligently, a person or a group of persons must act from common meanings and from a common set of moral principles. No conflict of norms can be resolved satisfactorily outside of a democratic matrix which, in the last analysis, guarantees the individual the right to help select the common goals of the group and to help determine the norms by which these goals are to be reached. Democracy is the antithesis of dictatorship which, as I understand it, means that the minority, consisting either of persons or of institutions, prescribes the norms for other persons or for other institutions.

The social scientists must be very careful in advocating a system of values and in advocating "scientifically tested" social practices. The subject-matter of the social sciences is quite unlike that of the so-called "natural sciences," for the social sciences are dealing with problems that are man-made and are to that extent conventional. Finding the proper norms is by no means like discovering a law of nature. The norms would be altogether meaningless without human purposes and ends. And since there are many different possible ends men may achieve, no one of which is necessary, we must select ends and then formulate hypothetically what we believe to be not only the most technically desirable way of attaining them, but also the most ethically desirable way. That is, we must consider the implications for other ends of our method of achieving a particular end. The technician cannot tell us whether it is right or wrong to drive down town on the left-hand side of the street. Such behavior is right or wrong, not with reference to pure science and technology, but with reference to arbitrarily agreed upon moral practices which are always formulated with reference to the harmony of ends. In a democracy we have agreed that every voting citizen should have a right to help determine the common ends of the community as well as the right to help formulate the norms to which we conform in achieving those ends.

The Social Scientists and Norm Makers

If we study history, we find many philosophers, theologians, and some "social scientists" proclaiming that they have discovered the ends of society as well as the laws according to which men should behave in reaching those ends.

But what I should like to make clear at this juncture is that if it is the function of a science to discover the basic principles and the laws according to which a set of phenomena will behave if left to itself, and if in addition we accept the principle that phenomena ought to behave accord-

ing to their "nature," then it is impossible to use science as such as a means of control or as a direct means of solving any social problem. More concretely, if it is the function of the social sciences to discover the laws of our being, that is, to discover how men would act if not controlled by external forces, namely, *institutions*, then the only function of science is to help us distinguish between "natural" social practices and "institutionized" practices so that we can do away with the latter. Or again, if we assume that there should be unchanging principles and an unalterable human nature at the base of a social science and that, consequently, "true" human values are fixed, then inevitably we will come out with a *laissez faire* doctrine, and the hope that we will be able to solve social problems by means of the social sciences is forever precluded. Norms are man-made and they are, therefore, conventional, for they could be otherwise. A physical law could not be otherwise. But if we suppose there is a natural unconventional law which it is our business as social scientists to discover, it would be folly to discover it, since men could not act otherwise than according to such a law anyway. There is no such thing as two or more conflicting laws of nature. But two or more norms may conflict and that is because men prescribe them.

When we ask what such men as Hobbes, Rousseau, Adam Smith, William Sumner, and Pareto are trying to do, we find them saying they are trying to get back to nature. They are trying to get at the basic principles of human nature in order to find out how man *ought to behave*. These reformers maintain that certain institutions prevent men from behaving according to basic human principles. Now when we ask what these reformers are about, it seems that they are trying to find a moral basis for establishing a certain set of norms, for advocating a certain interpretation of men, and for making a certain institution the primary one. But all along they pretend that institutions prevent men from acting naturally. Yet when the chips are down, they substitute one institution for another on irrational grounds.

What most people have been demanding of social science is something in the nature of a contradiction. They seem to want social scientists to find out how men behave naturally, as they would act if not controlled by institutions and their accompanying norms and values, in order to be able to control them *by* an institution. In the back of the minds of those who demand of the social scientists that they discover the "real" principles and laws of social behavior is the hidden assumption that institutions are artifacts and conventions and that the "true" laws of social behavior are natural and unconventional. We seem to want social scientists to discover the principles according to which uncontrolled men behave, in order to control them. Obviously these demands are self-contradictory, and social scientists should be warned against com-

mitting the cultural fallacy of mistaking a statement of the facts for a statement of norms or of defining what *ought to be the case* in terms of what is in fact the case.

Social scientists are themselves partly responsible for the present confusion, for they claim to adhere to the facts but often refuse to look for reasons for the facts. Many social scientists lament the fact that "as yet we have made little progress in accurate measurement of social phenomena;" as if values, attitudes, and norms have least common denominators and can be expressed accurately by use of numbers and units of measurement. Social scientists might well profit from a rigorous course in psychoanalysis. When a psychoanalyst studies a patient, he does not want to know simply what the patient does; he wants to know, rather, why he does what he does. The psychoanalyst tries to get at attitudes and norms of behavior. A statement of how in fact people act is not at all equivalent to a statement of the normative principles which are set up as controls over behavior. To think so is to commit the cultural fallacy, and this would be like saying a person should have hit his finger and not the nail, because in fact he did hit his finger although he wanted to hit the nail. And although we seem to have assigned to social scientists a contradictory task of finding out what ought to be by a careful analysis of the *status quo*, nevertheless, I believe the words "social science" mean something, and now our task will be to clarify that meaning.

The Function of the Social Sciences

First of all, basically, knowledge is for the sake of practice and control. Reflective thinking does not take place apart from bodily activity and an environment in which we act. This does not mean that abstract thinking such as takes place in pure mathematics and in symbolic logic is impossible apart from a definite immediate problem to which such calculations can be applied. But it does mean that reasoning and reflective thinking are rooted in a biological, environmental matrix, and that their significance is to be found in the fact that sooner or later they find expression in behavior. All of us believe that if we knew more about basic social principles, things could be changed, and we believe that unless we *do* know more, things will not be better, but probably worse. Listen to the physical scientists bemoan the fact that our lack of knowledge in the social sciences endangers the very existence of the physical sciences. If we are seeking diligently after knowledge, it is obvious that we have preconceived goals and that we believe these goals can never be reached if things are left to themselves. It is possible to control our behavior by symbols for events away from us both spatially and temporally. And those who contend that the values or ends we work toward are those to which we have been conditioned by mores, do

not seem to understand that science is not a means of perpetuating the *status in quo datur*, but a means of getting away from it. *We want to study human social phenomena in order to control processes leading to desired goals.* But can a purist, that is, a truly dispassionate scientist, discover how men ought to behave in working toward desired goals? A good social scientist, some say, must stick to the facts, teach the facts, but never ask *why*. He must never pass value judgments—that is being biased, and it means breaking faith with the scientific priesthood. But contrariwise it is obvious that a statement of actual overt behavior or of the actual practices of a person or a group of persons does not contain a statement of a conflict, for conflicts are in attitudes—tendencies to act in different ways—but never express themselves directly in practice. On the basis of a statement of the overt behavior involved, one could not distinguish between “stealing” and simply appropriating certain material goods for oneself. But behind the act of stealing there may be conflicting attitudes entertained by the thief, and certainly the norm which he employs in stealing conflicts with the explicit moral principles known to and accepted by the group as a whole. It is clear that a social scientist cannot discover these conflicts in attitudes and norms directly by observing actual practices, but rather by a study of overt behavior one must indirectly, and through extrapolation, arrive at attitudes and norms. The basic reason why the study of a single act cannot lead directly to a knowledge of the norm back of it is that a norm necessarily concerns the coordination of such single acts with reference to the harmony of the ends effected by these various acts, one end corresponding to each single act.

The basic difference between social problems and the problems of the purists or the pure research scientist, if you will, is that social problems emerge only because the way of achieving or the actual achievement of certain desired ends precludes the achievement of other desired ends, and hence the problem of the social scientist is to resolve the conflict in those attitudes or norms which precludes the harmony of ends, and a resolution of the conflict can be effected by taking into consideration not only behavior now taking place (things as they are—the *status quo*) but also what may possibly take place. The social scientist is concerned with immediate ends in relation to mediate ends. The social scientist is concerned with attitudes and norms, for prior to their achievement ends can be coordinated if controlled by the proper attitudes and norms. On the other hand, the pure scientist studies things as they are—the *status quo*—without reference to the desirability of what is, or he may study the impersonal causal relationship between means and ends without reference to the desirability of the ends. In short, the pure scientist studies situations irrespective of values, desired ends, or

the harmony of ends, and for that reason such studies exclude the psychological and the temporal dimensions of social problems.

No science makes sense apart from ends to be achieved, for knowledge is for the sake of enlightened conduct, and enlightened conduct may be controlled not only by a knowledge of the immediate consequences of an act but also by a knowledge of its mediate consequences; when it is controlled by the latter, it is controlled by norms. Those who acknowledge that social science may possibly have some practical value but say, nevertheless, they are interested in pure research and that norms neither interest them nor become their dignity, are apparently unable to distinguish between social problems on the one hand and technical and pure-science problems on the other hand. But we believe the social sciences can be distinguished from other sciences on the basis of the psychological factors involved, and this amounts to a distinction between situations in which desires are present and those in which they are absent. In older terminology it would amount to a distinction between purposive behavior which is free, and blind mechanical behavior which is strictly determined.

To say that all social problems involve a conflict in norms implies that if we could agree on norms there would be no *social* problems. All problems would then be technical problems. If two norms are contradictory, both cannot be used at the same time by a single person, nor can different persons or groups of persons cooperate in arriving at common goals or in an equitable distribution of goods, but rather they can cooperate only in conflicts over goals which both cannot achieve. For example, people may believe it is better not to talk about syphilis than to cure it, and in that case a person cannot both cure syphilis and not talk about it. Or one may believe it is better not to have an illegitimate child than to avoid an abortion. This continuous conflict in society over norms can be "easily" resolved under a political or religious dictatorship, for then "social science," if there still remains such a thing, would consist wholly in devising suitable means for the accomplishment of ends prescribed by the superiors, and, of course, the superiors would prescribe the norms for the means also. Under these circumstances the social sciences would degenerate into a technology, for if any one person or any one group of persons prescribes the values and, therefore, the norms, then "social science," if it still goes by that name, will degenerate into the business of finding the technical means of achieving those values. Value-judgments in that case will be made by the priesthood of dictators who will be known as the ones who see in clairvoyant fashion the true nature and end of man. Time and again we find German officers of the last war saying they were simply carrying out the commands of their superiors, and even Lisa Koch of Buchenwald

was considered practically free from moral responsibility. But if there is no conflict of norms we have no social problems. If we have problems at all, they will be technical problems. If everyone agrees that smallpox should be eliminated if the treatment does not conflict with basic norms, then the only problem is a technical one—it is the problem of finding the means to that end. Under a political dictatorship "social science" problems are resolved into technical problems.

The proper function of the social sciences is to study social situations involving a conflict in norms and to state the results of these studies so that they can be used by the people to resolve these conflicts. But conflicts in a democracy cannot be resolved directly by social scientists any more than the physical scientist can determine when and where guns are to be used. However, it is easy enough to see that there are certain conflicts between the attitudes of labor and capital, say, or between the property owner and the thief, or between the communist and the capitalist, etc. Sufficient data may help people with conflicting attitudes to agree on a program in which both parties can participate willingly.

One thing is certain. If social scientists hope to contribute to the solution of social problems, they must stop trying to justify the relativity of norms and mores. This means they must quit saying that everyone can see from practice that right and wrong are relative matters. Instead they will be working to get rid of this relativity in order to make room for cooperation. It is easily seen that insofar as science has had an influence in any field, whether it be esthetics, medicine, agriculture, industry, religion, or any other, it has resulted in doing away with the relativity of norms and of establishing common principles from which all of us can cooperate effectively. Science at its best, as all of us can see after the innovation of atomic energy, requires the cooperation of the entire world. If all that the social scientists can tell us is that what is "right" in Guatemala is "wrong" in Timbuctu and what is "right" in Russia is "wrong" in America, and *vice versa*, they had better close the books. Where cooperation is desired, there can be no basis for justifying the relativity of norms, for in the last analysis, if a norm is peculiar to and therefore relative to a particular group, it is also a limitation, for it prevents cooperation with other groups. And although all norms (and mores) may be relative in the sense that they are conventional and are designed to meet certain present demands and effect certain desired ends, they are not relative in the sense that one is as good as the other as a basis for cooperation. Cooperation between groups with regard to the attainment of common values requires common norms and the dissolution of relative ones.

As I understand Professor Northrop's main contribution to the problem

of world cooperation, made in his three books,⁸ it amounts to a clarification of the norms by which different people and different nations carry on their group activities (often *en masse*). Such a clarification, it is hoped, will make it possible for the various nations to agree on a common norm so as to insure peace, security, and stability in human society. Probably there will be compromises here and there by all nations, and it is hoped that the final result will lead to common norms and the absence of relativity. The absence of the kind of relativity of which we speak does not mean that there is such a thing as *absolute* right and wrong, nor that within common norms there will be no room for the gratification of individual needs and the selection of various peculiar ends. It means, rather, that cooperation, peace, security, and stability presuppose common norms, and that it is partly because of the relativity of norms that conflicts arise.

Social scientists can act in good faith by presenting to the students and to the public the various possible ways in which conflicts in norms may be settled, and in the information given out they can include the alternative possible consequences of following certain procedures. In general, the social scientist can do what the physical scientist has done—lay his information before the public, and as a citizen exercise the art of persuasion in trying to get people to consider such information in selecting the goals they seek and in formulating the norms according to which they will seek those goals. This is not to suggest that *the* base of ethics should be science. It suggests, rather, that science may well become *one* of the factors employed or taken into consideration in the formulation of ethics and the norms. Religion, esthetics, economics, etc., may well be other components taken into consideration. And if after the scientist has done his work there still remains a conflict in norms, it will not be because we are unscientific or evil-minded or unesthetic or irreligious, but rather because men do not care to utilize information in the same way. But after the social scientist has offered his information, and as a citizen has exercised the art of persuasion, he must then remember the story of the man with the hoe—and the grass roots.

⁸*The Meeting of East and West; The Logic of the Sciences and the Humanities; Ideological Differences and World Order.*

The Sources of Profit and the Economic Revolution of Our Time

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I

Our economic system is going through a revolutionary change. Individual independence, initiative, and enterprise, which we like to regard as characteristics of American capitalism, are fast disappearing. In their place an increasingly powerful state increasingly directs and restricts our economic activities and assumes responsibility for our welfare.

Why is this happening to us? Why are we unable, despite our profession of faith in the old virtues, to check the advance of the totalitarian behemoth? Is our traditional capitalistic system retreating under an external attack or are its foundations crumbling with internal decomposition?

II

Several times in the past capitalism has gone through similarly fundamental changes setting off from each other what are commonly called the stages of capitalist development. Historical "stages" are always arbitrary segmentations of a continuous process; they depend on the observer's point of view and choice of criteria. Consequently it is possible to discern as many stages as one might wish and to quarrel about their validity. But economists generally agree on recognizing at least three stages of capitalist development:

1. Commercial capitalism
2. Competitive industrial capitalism
3. Corporate monopoly capitalism, or finance capitalism.

A review of these three stages and of the circumstances that caused each to supersede its predecessor and in turn yield to its successor will help to illumine the nature and causes of the transformation currently taking place.

1. Commercial capitalism was the first incarnation of capitalism. The early capitalists were traders; their capital consisted of their stock in trade; they bought and sold wares for a profit; their field of action was the market for commodities. Representative merchant capitalists were such men as Jakob Fugger, the Augsburg merchant prince who bankrupted himself in the service of the Hapsburg emperors, or John Hancock, the "prince of the Boston smugglers" who was a leader in the revolt against the English king.

The mercantile period of capitalism, which may be said to have

lasted, roughly, from the discovery of America to the American Revolution, was characterized by extensive and detailed regulation of economic activity by powerful, paternalistic monarchical governments. The subordination of economic, as of all social activities, to the interests of the state was taken for granted.

2. Competitive industrial capitalism was the next stage, extending—again only as a rough approximation—to the American Civil War. The capitalists of this era were mostly people who owned factories, either as individual proprietors or in partnership with others. Capital consisted typically of instruments of production, such as factories, machines, and other goods employed in the process of production. The industrial capitalists hired wage workers to serve the machines in producing goods and expected to profit by selling the goods at more than it cost to produce them. To the commodity market which had previously been the only hunting ground of the capitalists, was now added the market for the factors of production; and the center of gravity had shifted to the latter.

Industrial capitalists of that period were men such as Richard Arkwright, the English barber who invented the spinning frame and became the richest textile manufacturer of his time, or Matthew Boulton who with James Watt manufactured steam engines.

Laissez-faire, that is to say, the principle of “let alone” or non-interference by government in the economic affairs of the community, dominated this period. Ordered progress was expected to result, not from conscious guidance by the statesman, but from the unconscious, automatic directives of free markets in which many individuals of approximately equal bargaining power competed both as buyers and sellers of goods and services. The republican form of government best corresponded to these aims and principles.

3. Corporate monopoly capitalism, or finance capitalism, may be thought of as extending into our own time, or, to mark off also this stage of capitalist development by wars—the hideous milestones along the road of human progress—it may be thought of as beginning with the American Civil War and ending with the Second World War. For the capitalistic countries of Europe, the First World War would be a more appropriate terminus.

In this stage of capitalism, economic decisions and activities of the nation came to be largely controlled by a few hundred corporations commanding huge aggregations of capital. Through sheer size, mass production methods, or by dint of the inherently monopolistic character of their activities—as in the case of railroads, electric light and power companies or telephone companies—these corporations assumed the character of monopolies or near-monopolies. They were not subject to the

dictates of the market, as were the smaller competing firms of earlier days, but more often themselves dominated the market.

Most large corporations manage resources contributed by many investors who obtained financial instruments—stocks and bonds or other securities—of the corporation in exchange for funds or other property which they turned over to it. Thus the investors' capital came to consist very largely of the instruments of *finance*, not as previously of the instruments of *production*, or of stock in *trade*. Profits came not only from trade and production, but from manipulation of securities. The securities market, now added to the factor market and the commodity market as a profit-hunting preserve, became fulcrum and symbol of this finance capitalist era.

Representative monopoly or finance capitalists were such men as Commodore Vanderbilt, Jay Gould, John D. Rockefeller, and other financial giants of the last century; Pierpont Morgan, the monopolist of finance who launched the United States Steel Corporation, itself a prototype of the monopoly finance capitalistic business corporation; the Van Sweringens, who controlled many railroads through adroit securities manipulation; Samuel Insull, whose financial wizardry earned him a public utilities empire. But if these were the glittering stars of the epoch, a less conspicuous type of capitalist was nevertheless still more representative of it: the investor who kept his securities in his vault, periodically cashing his dividend and interest coupons, but who exercised no direct control over the industries which produced his income and who frequently did not know what nor where these industries were. The finance capitalistic stage was marked by absentee ownership; the task of controlling the means of production and of making them yield an income was left to hired managers and their hired help.

Laissez-faire continued to be the accepted principle of government in this period, though government regulation and control of economic activities were increasingly invoked by the victims of monopolies.

III

The transition from each of these stages of capitalism to the next constituted nothing less than a revolution. The "way of life" was altered fundamentally by changes in the mode of production and by accompanying social, political, and ideological upheavals. The establishment of merchant capitalism was signalized by what is usually described as the *Commercial Revolution*. The advent of competitive industrial capitalism is associated with the *Industrial Revolution*. Monopoly, or finance capitalism, was ushered in by what more recently has been termed the *Corporate Revolution*.

Why did these revolutions take place? Why did capitalism go through

successive stages of development? Who were the people who, consciously or not, carried the revolutionary torch? What were their motives, their objectives?

To answer in one word: profit. Profit, or more accurately the quest for profit, was the moving force which set in motion the rapid and almost continuous social changes of which the three above-named revolutions are merely the most conspicuous and significant manifestations. It was the lure of profit which urged merchants to send their ships around the globe, to discover continents and found colonies. Profit impelled manufacturers to replace handicraft with machine industry. Profit bade financiers launch corporations and create and monopolize one industry after another. Profit was the aim, the motivating power which incited men to action, innovation, invention.

Societies have always been molded by the interests of their ruling classes. Capitalist society was no exception to this rule but, on the contrary, a strong affirmation of it. The interest of capitalists is to make profits. The quest for profit is the feature which characterizes and defines a capitalistic system. It is only natural that the successive stages through which capitalism developed should be found to reflect the changing directions in which profits were pursued and the changing conditions under which profit could be made.

What are the conditions under which profits can be made? What are the sources from which profits spring? Did new sources of profit emerge with each stage of capitalist development? These questions have rarely been asked or answered by economists. Yet it is precisely in the answers to these questions that we find the leading clue to an understanding of past stages of the capitalistic system and of its present crisis.

IV

In capitalistic society economic processes are largely directed by firms which are in business for the profit they hope to get. Every decision by firms is made with reference to profit. When firms do not expect, or in the long run, taking the bad years with the good, do not actually make profits, they will not and cannot continue to do business. The economy must stagnate. Only sufficient profits and the expectation that they will continue, can assure prosperity. Because of this dependence on profit, the capitalistic system is also called the profit system.

Profit is the difference between the revenue obtained from sales and the cost incurred in producing the goods sold. It is easy to see how any individual firm can make a profit; but how can all firms together take in more than they paid out? What firms pay out as costs (not counting what they pay to each other) becomes income for those who contributed to the production of the output, that is, for the owners of

the factors of production. If the recipients of these factor incomes (as they will be called subsequently) spend them all on the goods they have produced, firms will come out just even, without profit or loss. How then can profits nevertheless come about?

The problem can perhaps be shown more clearly in the following diagram:





Diagram 1

The upper line represents the cost incurred by all firms together in producing output within a given period such as a year. This cost is exactly equal to, or rather identical with, the incomes received by those who contributed to the production of output. A payment of wages, for instance, is a cost to the employer, income to the employee. Costs (and factor incomes) are assumed to be 100, which may mean one hundred billion dollars a year, or one hundred per cent, or just one hundred.

To simplify the argument, it is assumed that decisions as to how much to produce rest entirely with profit-seeking firms, no part of them with government or other non-profit agencies. Firms, then, cause output costing 100 to be produced, and pay 100 to the people who supply production factors, in the expectation of selling the output for more than 100. As an industrial economist recently put it: "The whole genius of industry is to so spend a dollar that it returns like the Australian boomerang to its spender, with a little profit-dime attached." But where does the profit-dime come from? To whom can the firms sell the output? Primarily, of course, to the recipients of the factor incomes. But these cannot spend more than 100, their entire income, on the goods and services offered for sale to them. (If they supplement their incomes by borrowing from banks, there must be an insufficiency of demand in the future when repayment is due. If accumulations out of past incomes are drawn upon, there must have been a deficiency of demand in the past.)

This impasse can be avoided, and firms can make profits, if factor owners receive incomes larger than the cost of producing the goods offered to them for consumption. One way in which such a situation can be brought about is to devote a part of the output to goods which are *not* offered for consumption to the recipients of factor incomes.

*Diagram 2*

In Diagram 2, one-fifth of the total output is withheld from the recipients of factor incomes. If now the latter should spend their entire income, still amounting to 100, on the goods offered to them, and the production of which cost only 80, firms would realize a profit of 20 on these goods.

V

What is to be done with the remaining portion of the output? One fairly obvious solution is to sell it to another community, that is, to export it. If the sale of these surplus goods abroad brings in 20, firms will have realized a profit of 20 on their total transactions. (They incurred costs of 100, received 100 back from the people at home and 20 from the people abroad, a total of 120.) If the goods are sold for more than 20, so much the better for the firms; and if they are sold for less than 20, say 15, this still affords firms a profit of 15. Of course, this is so only if the profit-creating exports are not offset by profit-destroying imports. If the one-fifth of output not offered for sale at home were shipped to foreign countries merely in exchange for other goods, which is often asserted to be the purpose and justification of trade between nations, no *profit* could accrue to any country from such exchanges, however useful they may be in other respects. To be a source of profits, exports must be net, above imports.

When we look at exports in the light of their profit-creating power, the otherwise inexplicable policies of the merchant capitalist age become instantly clear and convincing. As long as capitalistic activity was confined to the commodity market and profits had somehow to be reaped on that field of activity, an export surplus was the logical device by which to assure profits to the national trading community. This is why merchants and statesmen of that period aimed for a surplus of exports over imports or a "favorable balance of trade," as it has been called from their day to ours. This is why, too, merchants and statesmen of that period had to be nationalistic in their outlook. The internationalist or cosmopolitan orientation of later stages of capitalism was out of place so long as capitalists of one nation could make profits only at the expense of their fellow capitalists in other countries. Naturally these

continuous mutual depredations, openly advocated and frankly undertaken, implied an almost continuous state of war. During the century preceding 1776, the date here somewhat arbitrarily chosen to mark the end of the mercantile period, England, though one of the peace-loving nations, was at war for 52 years, not counting the American Revolutionary War or such fringe conflicts as those connected with the conquest of India.

Later generations of economists vied with each other in ridiculing the fallacies of mercantilist theory and policy. However, considering the then existing conditions and regardless of whether or not merchants and statesmen clearly understood their motives, these theories and policies were not fallacious; they correctly pointed to the one source of profits available to a merchant capitalist society.

VI

Foreign trade was the fountainhead of profits during the mercantilistic period. A more satisfactory profit source was opened up as capitalism annexed the field of production. The industrial revolution substituted machine production for hand production—*machinofacture* for *manufacture*. This meant that great quantities of machines—and factories to house them—had to be produced. Industrial capital had to be accumulated. A portion of costs incurred by firms, and of incomes received by the owners of production factors, now arose from investments—from net additions to capital.¹ This is shown in Diagram 3. As previously net exports, so now net additions to capital account for the portion of output not offered to domestic consumers. Recipients have incomes of 100 available to spend on goods which cost 80 to produce.




Diagram 3

By definition capital consists of goods produced but *not* consumed. To the extent, therefore, that investments were made, fewer of the goods produced were offered for current consumption. Investments were

¹This is sometimes called *net* investments in contradistinction to *gross* investment. Gross investment is the total of additions made to capital within a given period. Net investment is obtained by subtracting from gross investment the amounts of capital used up during the same period. The term investment is here used in the sense of net investment.

thus a source of profits, even as were net exports of goods. Since the desire of capitalists to invest, to cause more machines and factories to be constructed, seemed insatiable, there was little occasion for the capitalists of the industrial stage to look for alternative sources of profit. A favorable trade balance was no longer pursued as the objective of economic policy, nor even deemed desirable. A new doctrine proclaimed that wealth grew, not out of trade, but out of production.

The tapping of the new source of profits had two concomitants: cosmopolitanism and individualism.

(1) Since the pursuit of profit through capital accumulation did not necessitate conflict with rival capitalist societies, the accent on nationalism and on military power to support economic ends was superfluous. The stage of competitive industrial capitalism could, therefore, develop an internationalist, or rather a non-nationalist, cosmopolitan outlook and doctrine.

(2) Since the tapping and preserving of the new source of profit did not require the aid of a strong state, government intervention in economic affairs was denounced as harmful. The doctrine of individualism and let-alone superseded acceptance of paternalism and public regulation of business.

VII

The corporate revolution, in its turn, opened up new sources of profit. Monopoly and finance became the devices by which the more successful firms secured and perpetuated their profits.

But monopoly profits can be made only at the expense of non-monopolists. Monopoly is a source of profit to any particular firm, not to the capitalistic society as a whole. If all firms were monopolies, they could not by virtue of this fact make one penny more profit, all taken together, than if they were all fiercely competing with each other. Regardless of the fact that each firm may be the only producer of its particular commodity and regardless of how much each monopoly may reduce its output in the hope of selling it at higher prices, together they would still face the problem of how to sell the total output for more than the total cost of production. Monopolists have an advantage only in a society largely populated by non-monopolistic firms; and it is the latter, more than the consumers, who are the victims of monopolistic exploitation.

Similarly, finance can be a source of profit to some only at the expense of others. The fortune made by the successful promoter in launching a corporation comes from those who contributed their resources to the new venture. The stock market speculator's gains are another speculator's losses.

As a fountainhead of profits monopoly and finance are similar to the favorable trade balance: they can yield profits to some groups of capitalists only at the expense of other capitalists. But whereas the export surplus victimizes foreign capitalists, monopoly and finance prey mainly upon capitalists at home. It is only natural, therefore, that the protest against monopoly and finance should have come from the injured members of the domestic business community. In the United States it was the farmers who spearheaded the campaign against monopoly and set in motion that accelerating train of governmental attempts to supervise, regulate, or control economic processes so characteristic of recent decades. But the ideology of let-alone is still sufficiently strong to make every branch of business oppose public intervention, except in its own behalf. Like a referee trying to keep the players in a game from hitting each other and himself receiving blows for his pains, so capitalistic government, called upon to protect capitalists from exploiting each other, is then denounced by all as hostile to business and intent on subverting the capitalistic system.




Revolutionary though the transition from competitive to monopoly industrial capitalism, or finance capitalism, was in many respects, it did not alter fundamentally the source of profit for the economy as a whole. This source continued to be the production of additional capital, or net investment. It was only recently that a new source of profits was tapped, and this in connection with the latest transformation of capitalist society which it is our object to explain.

VIII

Profits, as has been shown, can be had by business firms taken together only if consumers spend on the products offered to them for consumption an amount in excess of the cost of producing these goods. Because cost of production is at the same time the income of the owners of the factors of production, and because on an average and in the long run people cannot consume more than their incomes, the first requirement for the emergence of profit is that income be derived in part from some source other than the production of goods offered for consumption at home. Sections V, VI, and VII, traced these sources of "other" income and of profit—exports, investment, monopoly—through three stages of capitalist development.

But the fulfillment of the first requirement taken by itself is not sufficient to assure the actual emergence of profits; it merely creates a source of *potential* profits. The second requirement, which transforms potential into actual profits, is that income, from whatever sources derived, be actually used to purchase the goods that are offered for consumption. To the extent that people do not spend, but save, they deprive firms of

profits. If the recipients of factor incomes save an amount equal to (or, worse still, greater than) the income derived from activities other than consumer goods production, firms cannot make profits, no matter how great the amount of "other" income may be. The three diagrams below show how saving affects profits.



In Diagram 4 the potential profit arising from net investments or net exports is destroyed by saving of an equal amount on the part of factor income recipients. The amounts spent on consumption goods are equal to the cost of producing these goods. In Diagram 5 the recipients of factor incomes save only 10 and spend 90 on goods which cost 80, leaving a profit of 10; whereas in Diagram 6 they save 30, spend only 70 and consequently plunge firms into losses.

The ratio of saved income to total income (the so-called propensity to save) is influenced by many factors; foremost among them, by the size of income. The larger the income of which we dispose, the larger

the proportion of it that we are able to put aside. The poorest among us cannot save anything, the richest save most.* And in this connection it is the real income—the flow of goods and services produced—rather than money income which is of primary importance.

Now, the real income of people in capitalistic nations has been steadily increasing as vast accumulations of capital raised their productivity. Consequently their capacity to save has also increased. This is true even of the masses of factory workers and other manual laborers. In the early stages of the industrial revolution they were so poor that children had to be sent into the factories to supplement the wretched wages of their parents. In our own day most workers, provided they are employed at all, earn enough to save a modest sum if they manage carefully.

To counteract the rising ability and tendency of income recipients to save, investments should be increasing in relation to the cost of total output, if profits are to be maintained. Actually, however, investments tend to be a decreasing portion of total output. Accumulation of capital lessens the need and blunts the incentive for still further accumulation of capital. A familiar principle of economics is that the more we have of a good, the less useful to us will be additional quantities of it. This rule applies not only to consumption goods, but also to goods used in production; it is known as the law of diminishing marginal utility when applied to the former, and as the law of diminishing marginal productivity when applied to the latter.

To earlier generations it seemed that the hunger for capital could never be satiated and that therefore capital accumulation could go on indefinitely and at an increasing tempo provided only that people saved enough. Our own time offers a different outlook. There are barriers to capital accumulation. Monopolistic industries want to limit output, so as to keep prices high; consequently they have little desire to enlarge their productive capacity, which in many cases seems already excessive. This attitude was neatly expressed by the eminent steel manufacturer Eugene Grace shortly before America's entry into World War II, when the need for more steel producing capacity was debated. To build additional steel plants, said Mr. Grace, would constitute "inflation in production."

The decline of investments has been characteristic of recent decades and has become one of the central preoccupations of economic science. Although the reasons for the waning of this fount of profits have not

*By a familiar paradox, the upper third of income recipients in the United States before World War II saved more than all income recipients taken together. The contradiction is apparent only. The middle third saved nothing, while the lowest third regularly *dis*saved.

been sufficiently explored, it is uncontested that private investment has slackened. A study by Professor Simon Kuznets reveals a steady drop in the ratio of net capital formation to net national product^a over the last half century.

Table I
Net Capital Formation
In Percentages of Net National Product,
1869 - 1938*

1869-78	13.7
1879-88	14.6
1889-98	16.2
1899-08	13.6
1909-18	13.0
1919-28	10.2
1929-38	1.5

*Kuznets, Simon. *National Product Since 1869*, New York, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc., 1946. Percentages are calculated from figures of net capital formation and net national product, both in 1929 prices, on pp. 118, 119.

The shrinking of investment added to an increasing propensity to save, meant that the fountainhead of profit was fast drying up; the capitalistic economy was in danger of dying away, much as Palmyra and other cities that had flourished in antiquity were reduced to desert ruins for want of water. If this fate was to be averted, a new source of profit had to be tapped.

IX

Capitalistic nations at first attempted to extricate themselves from their predicament by a return to the nationalistic beggar-my-neighbor policies of exporting more than importing. Subsidies to exporters and "dumping" (selling at less than cost) were weapons used to attain this end. Naturally, nations on the losing side promptly defended themselves with import restrictions, exchange controls, and bilateral trade agreements. This had the effect of nullifying any attempts to solve capitalistic difficulties through foreign trade and of reducing the volume of international trade and therefore of the true benefits to be derived from it. In addition, it drew governments into still another sphere of economic activity, for the various exchange and trade controls clearly required active intervention by the state.

This return to mercantilistic devices was followed or accompanied by a second device for maintaining profits. Inadequate private investments

^aNet national product is, roughly, the sum total of all goods and services produced during an indicated period, less the goods consumed in the process of production, e.g., wear and tear on equipment.

were supplemented with expenditures on public works, that is, with public investments. In his first election campaign former President Herbert Hoover proclaimed and promised this method of supporting profits as the policy of his administration. Apparently he recognized, even in prosperous America in the prosperous year 1928, that the moving power of the capitalistic system was running down. Although inherently more likely to succeed than attempts to wrest profits from international trade, because it did not depend on the willingness of foreign countries to be victims, the policy of public investments was nevertheless inadequate. The traditional objects of public investment are post offices, courthouses, roads, perhaps dams. Other investments, as in steel plants, were considered out of bounds for the state. Now one cannot keep building billions of dollars worth of post offices, roads, and dams year after year. To be sure, many dams were built in the depression years of the thirties and it is appropriate that the great Boulder Dam should have been renamed Hoover Dam as a monument to the great champion of dam business. But the costs of public works of the traditional kind could not suffice to replenish and to expand the rapidly waning profit sources. Larger sums were required.

Expediency, rather than theoretical insight, showed governments a more effective way of achieving their purpose. If intervention on the production side through conventional public works was inadequate and if public investments in industrial plants and other fields of enterprise hitherto reserved to private business was unpalatable to the business community, why not intervene on the consumption side? The requirement for the emergence of profit is that the community spend on the goods offered to it by firms an amount in excess of the costs incurred by firms for the production of these goods. This need not be achieved by diverting a part of production to export or investment. It could also be done by supplementing the consumption expenditures of factor income recipients with consumption expenditures by government. Even in the absence of any net exports or net investments, firms could make profits provided government spend more than enough to offset the amounts saved by the recipients of factor incomes. This is shown in Diagram 7.




Diagram 7

Firms are here assumed to offer the entire output costing 100 for sale at home. Factor-income recipients spend only 80, which would leave firms with losses of 20. But government comes to the rescue with expenditures of 30, turning the threatened loss into a profit of 10.

Government expenditures must be "net," that is, in excess of government receipts, if they are to have a profit creating effect, even as exports had to be net, in excess of imports, and as investments had to be net, in excess of capital currently used up. If government should recover its expenditures of 30 through taxes, the income of individuals would be diminished by an equal amount thus causing them to retrench consumption expenditures. It is the excess of government spending over government revenue, that is, the deficit or government net spending, that counts. Advocates of public spending have called these net expenditures "*net income-creating expenditures*" thereby pasting the label of approbation on what previously was considered an unmitigated evil under the name of "deficits." Deficits have a flavor of bad financial management, whereas net income creating expenditures suggest social benefits. A more appropriate name would have been "*profit-creating expenditures*," for this is the true purpose and meaning of continued and accelerating government deficits in the United States in all but two of the last twenty years.

It would be possible for government to cover its expenditures through taxes without diluting their profit-creating strength only on condition and to the extent that private consumption expenditures were not thereby reduced. If, for instance, it were possible to tax away the 20 saved by factor income recipients without curtailing their consumption expenditures, a deficit of 10 could create as much profit as the deficit of 30 in Diagram 7. Again, on the assumption that people save 20 per cent of their incomes no matter how large or small that income may be, any part of the individuals' income taxed away and spent by government will have some profit-creating effect because the government spends 100 per cent of the income transferred to it, whereas individuals would have spent only 80 per cent. Thus, if the government should tax away 100 per cent of factor incomes and do the spending itself, it would spend 100, leaving firms without profits but also without losses. A deficit of 10 would suffice to give firms a profit of 10. But some deficit is required in any case if profits are to be made and if they fail to spring sufficiently from other sources.

X

With the decline of private investments the capitalistic economy was no longer able to run under its own power; its functioning, its very existence now depends on support by government. We have thus reached a new stage of capitalist development, characterized by extensive government intervention in, and support of, business. The prime cause or agent

which has led us into this new era of capitalism is the same that was chiefly accountable for all previous stages of development: profit. It was because of the drying up of the main spring of profit which had been investment, and because without profits a profit system must languish, that government was compelled to enter, or re-enter, into society's economic affairs. Its net profit-creating expenditures generated a new flow of profit and thus enabled the capitalistic economy to revive and continue to function.

The jeremiads of business organizations and of their spokesmen would have us believe that, on the contrary, confiscatory taxes and government interference with business in this new era of public spending had all but destroyed profits. The two tables below tell a different story.

TABLE II

YEAR	NATIONAL INCOME	CORPORATE PROFITS BEFORE TAX	% OF NAT'L INCOME	CORPORATE PROFITS AFTER TAX	% OF PROPRIETORS' NAT'L AND RENTAL INCOME	% OF NAT'L INCOME
	IN BILLIONS OF \$			IN BILLIONS OF \$		
1929	87.4	9.8	11.2	8.4	9.6	22.5
1933	39.6	.2	.5	-.4	-1.0	18.2
1939	72.5	6.5	9.0	5.0	6.9	20.3
1941	103.8	17.2	16.6	9.4	9.1	20.0
1944	183.8	24.3	13.2	10.8	5.9	13.9
1946	180.3	23.5	13.1	13.9	7.7	23.3
1947	198.7	30.5	15.3	18.5	9.3	21.3
1948	223.5	33.8	15.1	20.7	9.3	21.2
1949	216.7	28.3	13.1	17.3	8.0	19.1
1950	239.0	41.4	17.3	22.8	9.5	18.4

Source: Federal Reserve Bulletin

Throughout the period of heavy public spending, from 1933 to the present, profits, so far from vanishing, have steadily increased from depression lows to unprecedented heights. Even when considered in relation to national income, corporate profits have made an excellent showing and currently take practically as great a slice (after taxes!) of national income as they did in the fabled year 1929, before the advent of the allegedly harmful government interference. Profits of unincorporated business firms cannot be readily ascertained, but figures for "proprietors' and rental income" which include noncorporate profits, indicate that unincorporated business participated in the boom.

An even better measure of how profits have fared is afforded by expressing them as a percentage of invested capital.

These figures, compiled by an organization which cannot be suspected of wishing to overstate profits, speak for themselves. They would speak with still greater eloquence if the number of firms included in the study

TABLE III

YEAR	NUMBER OF FIRMS	NET PROFIT AS PERCENT OF NET WORTH*
1928	900	12.1
1929	1520	12.8
1930	1900	5.7
1931	1620	2.6
1932	1810	0.2
1933	1925	2.1
1934	1935	3.6
1935	2010	5.1
1936	2140	7.4
1937	2280	6.7
1938	2435	3.8
1939	2480	6.2
1940	2590	7.4
1941	2540	9.2
1942	2560	8.7
1943	2625	8.6
1944	2665	8.2
1945	2806	7.6
1946	2958	9.5
1947	3102	12.2
1948	3262	14.0
1949	3322	11.0
1950	3304	13.3

Source: The National City Bank of New York, Monthly Letter on Economic Conditions.

*Net profits are shown after depreciation, interest, taxes, and other charges and reserves, but before dividends.

Net worth includes book value of outstanding preferred and common stock and surplus account at beginning of each year.

were the same for each year. There seems to be a tendency for average return on net worth to be smaller, the larger the number of firms included. Thus, for 1929 the average return on net worth was 12.8 per cent for 1520 firms; but the 1900 firms included in the 1930 survey showed average returns of only 10.6 per cent in 1929. There is reason to suppose, therefore, that if 3000 firms had been included in the profit survey for the earlier years, the rate of return would have been smaller still, and the high return of the more recent years greater still by contrast.

XI

There can be no doubt that public spending has replaced net exports and net investments as a potent source of profit. But along with profits,

further social changes flow from this fountainhead of business prosperity. If government must spend, it must spend for something. The purposes as well as the dimensions of government spending necessarily have a profound effect on the economic system.

In what ways could government spend and for what purposes does it actually spend? There are three alternative ways for government to spend:

1. by purchasing goods or services directly
2. by giving gifts to individuals who will do the spending
3. by giving gifts to firms which thus get their profit directly from the government.

The last named alternative of giving direct subsidies to firms would be the most honest and direct device for assuring firms of profits. But businessmen do not seem to approve of this method, perhaps because it makes it too apparent that profits so obtained are not "earned." Also, to the extent that firms get direct handouts from government, the latter would have to determine how much each firm or at least each industry is to get, whereas with the other methods government would determine only the size of the aggregate profits, leaving to existing market processes the task of distributing this total among the several firms. Under the subsidy system government would have direct power over individual firms, while under mere wholesale provision of profits, business could more easily continue to control the government. Only firms which could not stand on their own feet under any circumstances naturally favor, and get, subsidies. Examples are aviation firms, some of which derive more than one-half of their revenues from subsidies.

Handouts to consumers—the second alternative—are a similar though less efficient way of channeling profits to firms. Not all of the additional income would find its way into the cash registers of firms, because part of it would be saved. Consequently, governmental expenditures in this direction would have to be larger in order to achieve a given result. This would be a minor objection to the dole device, if it qualified on other counts. But, as in the case of subsidies to firms, there are psychological and ideological objections also to this method. Much as people like to get something for nothing, they want to have it appear that it is theirs not only by legal, but also by moral right. Individuals as well as business firms, therefore, demand that government provide the conditions conducive to maximum prosperity in general, but do not want to be marked individually as the recipient of charity. Unemployment insurance, old age pensions are acceptable; doles are resented.

There remains the alternative of direct purchases of goods and services. This method avoids the appearance of relief, subsidy and charity. The

basic reason for government expenditures—to sustain profits—is here hidden by the ostensible needs of government for the goods and services bought. These needs are such as the promotion of public health, education, and above all, national defense; they can all be reduced to: welfare or warfare. Warfare and welfare are what most capitalistic nations have chosen as the principal objects of public spending. The new stage of capitalist development may accordingly be designated the stage of Warfare-welfare Capitalism.

In the United States “welfare” expenditures of the federal government are actually small compared with “warfare” expenditures. For the year ending June 30, 1952, national defense is to cost \$41,421 million, while social welfare is allotted \$2,625 million out of a total budget of \$71,594 million. The difference is really greater still because the “warfare” budget should include veterans services and benefits (\$4,911 million) and aid extended to our allies (\$10,664 million) which adds up to a total of \$56,966 million for warfare expenditures.⁴

It should not be overlooked, on the other hand, that the warfare budget includes large welfare expenditures made through the military departments. Our “welfare” capitalism puts a heavy accent on the uniform. The uniform, regardless of whether it was worn on the battlefield or in a Washington office, entitles the wearer to free medical and dental care, free education, pensions, bonuses. As Bill Mauldin recently said: “The Army is the perfect welfare state.” Even the welfare of the soul is provided for free of charge by uniformed priests and ministers, as advertisements sponsored by the armed services inform us. For ex-servicemen alone the United States government spent \$6,905 million in the fiscal year 1950, three times as much as the \$2,297 million devoted to the welfare of all other groups in the same year.

Warfare-welfare capitalism is revolutionizing our way of life. It brings paternalism, extensive regulation, supervision, and direction of economic activities, reminiscent of the mercantile period. It also means a return to the nationalism and warlikeness of that earlier period and necessitates concentration of power in national governments.

Like previous transformations of capitalist society, this latest revolution has been brought about by and for capitalistic interests. It is not the work of communists or any other enemies of capitalism. Without warfare-welfare our capitalistic system would languish for want of profits, as it did in the early 1930's. Government spending for warfare and welfare is the new fountainhead of profit which infuses fresh life into a moribund capitalism.

⁴Estimates of January, 1951

XII

Experience and analysis should have made it clear long ago that a capitalistic system can function only if firms taken as a whole can make profits. To explore the conditions under which profits emerge should therefore have been a paramount task for economics. But the science has been strangely silent on this point. The theory of profit such as it is at present, expounds, on the one hand, the conditions which allow *individual* firms to make profits and, on the other hand, the moral justification for profits. It concerns itself with whether profit is a payment for the use of capital, for entrepreneurial activity, or for risk-taking; and whether it is a factor income at all, or merely the residue left after all factor services have been paid.

These matters are irrelevant to the question of how a positive net profit can be made by firms as a whole—a question rarely raised and never correctly answered by capitalist economics. The mercantilists came close to it with their theory of the favorable balance of trade. Thomas Mun's celebrated book *England's Treasure by Foreign Trade* could have been named *English Merchants' Profits by Foreign Trade*. In modern times, again, J. M. Keynes and his followers treated the question by implication, though few direct references to it are found. In his *Treatise on Money* (1930), Keynes showed that aggregate net profits can come about only if current investments exceed current saving out of factor incomes. But he regarded a condition of zero profits, which he identified with the "equilibrium" position of the economy, as consistent with a high level of employment and output. In *The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money* (1936), employment and output were shown to fluctuate in response to profits, but Keynes put the emphasis on this rather than on the conditions which gave rise to aggregate profits.

By contrast with the mercantilists and the Keynesians who occupied themselves with *macro-economic* problems, with what determined the size of output as a whole or income as a whole, economists following the classical and neoclassical type of *micro-economic* analysis (e. g., analysis of the firm) never came near the question of overall profits. According to Professor Frank H. Knight "a theory of profit is inherently a theory of aberrations of actual economic conditions from the theoretical consequences or tendencies of the more general price forces which tend to eliminate them, a theory of the imperfections of competition, supplementary to the theory of perfect competition, defined in a sense which excludes profit."⁸

Traditional economists, well represented by Professor Knight, looked

⁸Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, Vol. XII. Article: Profit, by Frank H. Knight, p. 483.

only at the individual firm and enumerated the conditions under which any particular firm might reap a profit, but they never inquired into the subject of profit as a whole. And this failure to deal with the question most crucial to an understanding of how the profit system works, they paraded as the principle that profits on the average always tend to be zero.

In the whole literature of economics one work stands out for having asked and answered the question of where profits as a whole come from. This work is Karl Marx's *Capital*. But Marx did not give a satisfactory answer. He said that profits are derived from the exploitation of the workers. The worker receives as his wages only that part of his output which will pay for his subsistence, while the remainder, the surplus value, is appropriated by the capitalist as profit. Profit, said Marx, is "unpaid labor." Now this may be a valid explanation of what profit consists of. Indeed it is self-evident that any part of income going to those who have done nothing to produce it, must be at the expense of those who did produce it. Even Professor Knight expresses the same thought, only in more scholarly fashion: "If there is on the whole a positive net profit it is because enterprises compete cautiously and do not raise the values of productive services on the average to their full theoretical level." But how is it possible for capitalists not to pay labor? Would not competition among firms cause them to bid against each other for additional workers to exploit and would not, as a consequence, wages rise to the point where no profit can be made, as traditional economics asserted? What reason is there to believe that firms will not compete to the full, that they will be "cautious"? And if they do compete "cautiously" through collusion or other devices for establishing monopoly and if they thus succeed in keeping wages low and in withholding from workers a part of the product, to whom can the firms sell the product? Surplus value, as Marx himself said, had to be "realized" by the capitalist after he extracted it from the worker. It is on this ability to "realize" surplus value that the capitalists' profits depend. To "realize" surplus value they must sell the product of labor at profitable prices.

To explain profits, then, it is not enough to say that they are unpaid labor, or surplus value; it is necessary to show how this surplus value can be realized. The existence of a surplus is a necessary, but not a sufficient condition for the emergence of profits. If profits depended merely on the possibility of paying the laborer less than he produces, capitalists should never have difficulty in making profits. The fact that they frequently did have difficulty, as in the Great Depression, is *prima facie* evidence that the source of profits is not in surplus value. Surplus

¹*Ibid.*, p. 484.

value *is* profit, but it is not the *source* of profits, even as the water which flows in the river and *is* the river is not the source of the river.

XIII

Through all its stages, capitalism has been characterized by the *quest* for profit. Its successive stages of development are set off from each other primarily by their reliance on different *sources* of profit. The latest source to be tapped is public expenditures. Like exports and investments in previous stages, public expenditures now preserve the capitalistic system and its objective—profit. This is the logic of warfare-welfare capitalism; this is the meaning of the revolutionary changes currently besetting and bewildering our society.

Patterns in Introductory Social Science Courses in Southwestern Colleges and Universities¹

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General Interest in the Teaching of the Social Sciences

The majority of professional social scientists², like other scientists, are trained in highly specialized fields, but unlike other scientists their activities are usually confined to those of teaching. Social scientists in nearly all fields are limited as to their opportunities for utilizing otherwise their knowledge and techniques. Consequently, they are unable to extend the boundaries of what they already know and to improve skills already acquired. The reasons for these limitations are interacting and circular, as explained in a recent book on this subject by an internationally known author and teacher in the social sciences.³ The social scientist is unable in a hostile world to experiment and apply his knowledge to the solution of practical social problems and his inability to do so in turn becomes the basis of continuing skepticism as to the scientific character of his intellectual pursuits. In this state of affairs, the professional scientist becomes a professional teacher.⁴

The instructor in any of the social sciences, particularly at the college and university level, is thus confronted with two professional interests: that of a scientist in a specialized field and that of a teacher in this field. As a teacher the social scientist occupies a strategic position in that by improving the techniques and procedures of teaching and by influencing the attitudes of the young he may advance the cause of social science. There is considerable documentary evidence that the social scientists

¹This article is based upon a report made to a luncheon meeting held in the Stephen F. Austin Hotel in Austin, Texas, during the annual meeting of the Southwestern Social Science Association, March 1951. Dr. C. E. Ayres of the University of Texas and Mrs. Charles R. Scherer of Texas Christian University also reported at the same meeting on the specific courses they have taught for a number of years at their respective universities.

²It is assumed without argument in this report that the study of the behavior of human beings as members of organized groups is a matter of scientific analysis and that persons engaged in this study are scientists.

³*Testament for Social Science*, Barbara Wootton, W. W. Norton and Company, 1950, N. Y., p. 47-48.

⁴This is still true I believe, although I have not taken time to submit statistical proof, in spite of the fact that since the beginning of the "New Deal" in 1933 there have been increasing opportunities for employment for social scientists with government agencies. This tendency became even more pronounced during the War Years of 1942-1945, as indicated, for instance, in Stuart Chase's *The Proper Study of Mankind* and in Clyde Kluckhohn's *Mirror for Man*. The number of social scientists employed in private industry would most certainly be found still to be proportionately small as compared with the number employed in teaching.

have been conscious of their dual role and anxious to take advantage of the opportunities open to them in their role as teachers.

Historians, economists, sociologists and other social scientists in their various professional organizations, both as scientists and as teachers, have been concerned not only with research in their respective fields but with the progress made in the art and science of teaching in those fields. This latter concern was expressed in individual cases soon after the turn of the century⁶, and the widely known experiment in curriculum building in the social sciences at Columbia University had its origin in the period following the First World War. But it was in the depression years of the 1930's that this concern deepened and found expression in widespread curriculum revision in all fields at all educational levels.⁶ And the pre-occupation with the philosophy of "general education" on the part of an increasing number of persons, both professional and lay, has occurred during the last five years since the Second World War.⁷

Interest in the Southwest

Interest in the matter of the teaching of the social sciences, particularly of the introductory course or courses, in the Southwest developed during the academic year 1949-1950. Approximately 50 persons attended a

⁶Professor Morris Garnsey says in his Committee's Report published in the *American Economic Review Supplement* (Vol. XL, No. 5, Part 2, December 1950) that "in 1909 and again in 1911 significant conferences on the teaching of economics were held and during the next 30 years occasional round table discussions took place, and articles on the subject were published in various professional journals."

⁷Examples of publications on this matter:

Beard, C. A., *The Nature of Social Sciences in Relation to the Objectives of Instruction*, New York: C. Scribner's Sons, 1934.

Gray, W. S. (ed.), *General Education, Its Nature, Scope and Essential Elements*, Chicago, Illinois: The University of Chicago Press, 1934.

Horn, Ernest, *Methods of Instruction in the Social Sciences*, New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1936.

Report of the Commission on the Social Sciences, American Historical Association, *Conclusions and Recommendations*, New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1934.

⁸American Council on Education, *A Design for General Education*. Washington, D. C., 1944.

Garnsey, Morris E., "Integrated Courses in the Social Sciences," *The Teaching of Undergraduate Economics, American Economic Review*, XL, No. 5, Part 2, (December 1950) pp. 72-95.

Levi, A. W., *General Education in the Social Sciences*. Washington, D. C.: American Council on Education, 1948.

Malick, Clay P. and Garnsey, Morris, "The Case for General Education in the Social Sciences," *The Teaching of Undergraduate Economics, American Economic Review*, XL, No. 5, Part 2 (December 1950) pp. 214-221.

McGrath, Earl J. and others, *Toward General Education*, New York: The Mac-Millan Company, 1948.

Report of the Harvard Committee, *General Education in a Free Society*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1945.

luncheon meeting at the Rice Hotel during the annual meeting of the Southwestern Social Science Association in Houston in April, 1950^{*}. These persons were teachers of the various social sciences in the colleges and universities in the Southwest from which the Association draws its membership.

At this meeting resolutions were adopted (1) to hold another meeting during the next annual session of the Association and (2) to appoint committees to make studies and to report their findings on the teaching of introductory, or integrated, courses in social science in (a) the Southwestern colleges and universities and (b) in other colleges and universities. The committee making a study of the courses taught in the Southwest reported at a luncheon held in Austin during the annual meeting of the Association in March 1951. The other committee gave its report at an afternoon meeting on the same day. This article is concerned with the report given at the luncheon meeting.

Method of Inquiry by Committee

Each member of the committee^{*} reported on his experience in his institution and sent to the chairman names of other persons offering such courses and of institutions where he knew such survey courses were being presented. Every suggestion was pursued within the limits of time available. From October to December about 20 replies were received from those schools to which a general inquiry had been made. Some of the replies were detailed; others were briefer. Some were accompanied by copies of course outlines, mimeographed and printed syllabi, sample examinations and in several cases comprehensive texts written by faculty committees.

Because inquiries had been directed to persons who were known or thought to be teaching general, introductory, or integrated social science courses, it was decided in January that the patterns indicated by the replies to these inquiries might be misleading, since they did not involve a large enough or representative enough sample. From various membership lists compiled by the Association samples were selected from several different types of institutions in each of the eight southwestern states from which the Association draws its membership: Arkansas, Colorado,

^{*}This was arranged by Dr. R. B. Melton of North Texas State College, who was serving that year as chairman of the Economics Section.

^{*}The members were, in addition to Mrs. Sherer of Texas Christian University, Professors John B. McKinsey, Southern Methodist University, Dallas, Texas; John S. Kyser, Northwestern State College, Natchitoches, Louisiana; Homer Huitt, Arkansas State College, Jonesboro, Arkansas; James Taylor, Southwest State Teachers' College, San Marcos, Texas; J. L. Clark, Sam Houston State Teachers' College, Huntsville, Texas. All of these persons contributed some information which was incorporated into this report, but this report was not submitted because of a lack of time, to them for further comment and suggestions. The writer assumes all responsibility for what is said in this article.

Kansas, Louisiana, Missouri, New Mexico, Oklahoma, and Texas. The institutions to which inquiries were directed and those from which replies were received are listed below.

A questionnaire was prepared to be sent to additional schools in the hope of getting information in a more comparable form. The questionnaire was sent to a few of the earlier correspondents, but not to all for some of them had given rather complete details, and it was decided not to impose upon heavily-burdened college teachers for additional time. Since the information from all the schools varied greatly and since it was not reported in an entirely comparable form, even on the questionnaires, generalizations based upon this information were difficult to make. Although no explicit statement was made to any of the correspondents that data sent by them would be kept confidential, individual authority to identify the source of any information was not requested, with two exceptions, so that the report must be of a general nature. When details are given from individual replies, they will not be explicitly identified.

Nature of this Report

This report is a tentative one based upon fragmentary data. This is more of an explanation than an apology, since this report is what it is principally for two reasons.

In the first place, this committee worked at this matter for only six months, during whatever spare time college instructors may have these days. All work was conducted through correspondence, since no meeting of the committee was possible. This is in contrast to the time and methods employed by other committees engaged in similar inquiries. In such reports as *Toward General Education* and *General Education in a Free Society*, the publications were the products of committees, drawn in each case from a single institution, which met continuously for personal discussion for more than a year. The study reported on by A. W. Levi,²⁰ under the sponsorship of the American Council on Education, extended over a period of five years and was conducted in part by persons giving their entire time to the matter. The committee for which Professor Garnsey was reporting²¹ was appointed in 1944 and completed its work in 1950. By comparison, this is merely a preliminary report on the beginning of what it was hoped would be a continuing interest and investigation by this group of the Southwestern Social Science Association.²²

²⁰See note 7.

²¹At the afternoon meeting under the chairmanship of Professor Marion B. Smith of Louisiana State University in Austin in March, 1951, Dr. H. R. Mundhenke of Texas Christian University and Dr. Verne Sweedlun of Kansas State College were selected to plan for another meeting of the group in 1952 as a part of the program of the Association.

The second reason for the limited nature of this report is the character of the replies which in turn derives from the nature of the courses themselves. Some of the institutions which offer these courses have been offering them from 15 to 25 years; others have begun to offer them only in the last four or five years. But all the replies insisted upon the experimental character of all the courses offered. Nearly all correspondents in describing their courses emphasized their continuous revision.

Movement Toward Integration

Professor Garnsey has described the features of this movement so succinctly that it seems appropriate to quote him directly:

The social sciences achieved their differentiation largely during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The tendency toward sub-division and specialization which began after 1800 has continued up to the present for purposes of research; and equally specialized courses within the curriculum have followed as a matter of course. This subdivision of social science disciplines was doubtless necessary and perhaps inevitable once enough of the materials and techniques had accumulated to enable a discipline to set up house for itself. Each field could point to methods which were somewhat different from those employed in even closely related fields. The nature of its subject matter yielded more fruitful results where specialized techniques could be applied

A second factor in the atomization of higher learning occurred as college education became democratized and the four years in college came to be looked upon as training period for a career . . . the compartmentalization of higher learning . . . seemed perfectly natural in the nineteenth century individualistic society, but . . . is coming to be severely criticized in the twentieth.

It now seems apparent that in philosophy and in behavior the outstanding characteristic of the present century is still the growing tendency to emphasize a holistic and collectivist point of view. If we look at education and life today we find this trend taking many forms

There would seem to be justification, therefore, for the great interest now manifest in integrated courses. Such concern is not an accident, nor is it merely an educational fad. There is a genuine desire on the part of many to synthesize the parts of the social sciences into a new whole, not only for teaching purposes but for group research projects as well.¹²

Some of the courses taught in the Southwest and included in this report have been described in detail in some of the publications already cited. In the one edited by Professor McGrath is a detailed description of the courses taught at the University of Kansas, at Hendrix College and at Stephens College, all of which are included in this survey. Also in this same publication are accounts of the courses taught at Colorado State College of Education and the University of Kansas City, neither of which was included in this survey. No questionnaire was directed to the University of Colorado, although it was known from Professor Garnsey's report that his institution does offer such a course.

¹²Garnsey, op. cit. pp. 73-74.

Attitudes Toward Integration

Reflection upon the data collected from this area, incomplete as they are, reveals patterns very similar to those already noted in the other studies covering a wider area and a longer period of inquiry.

Inquiries and questionnaires were sent to the 44 colleges and universities indicated; replies were received from 36; and of this group 23 indicated that they were offering some type of general or introductory course in the social sciences. Some of the other 13 have offered such courses in the past but have discontinued them as "unsatisfactory." At least two of these are planning to make the attempt again soon by re-introducing such a course in their curriculum. One is a teachers' college and the other is a municipal university. A very few correspondents express complete disapproval of the attempt to offer these courses; many are enthusiastic and feel that they have accomplished considerable success; others are discouraged with their efforts but feel that the matter is so important that they must continue to experiment.

The most complete disapproval was expressed by Professor Cowgill of the University of Wichita in such strong terms that it is interesting to note his objections.

Having taught in such a course and observed several others, I am opposed to such a course on grounds of confusion and superficiality. A century ago such a course was given and called moral philosophy. It was an advance when, for purposes of analysis, the several new social science disciplines began to take society apart and analyze the several institutions separately—analysis usually required dissection. I do not see the advantage of returning to the approach of a century ago, except as a means of forcing instructors to broaden their background. However, this latter objective should not be achieved at the expense of the innocent student. The integrated and/or survey courses which I have observed have benefitted instructors more than students.

There is much truth in what he says, but it is not the whole truth. The great majority of the correspondents would tend to agree rather with the conclusions of Professor Garnsey's Committee.

Types of Courses in the Southwest

The most cursory examination of the general literature on the matter and of the results of the several surveys made of the integrated (or general or survey or introductory) courses offered either in the Southwest or in other areas reveals great confusion in the understanding and the use of these terms. They are not synonymous but they are not clearly differentiated either, and they are often used interchangeably as if they were identical in meaning. Professor Garnsey's Committee to define the term "integrated introductory course," but a definition confronted this difficulty in making its survey. No attempt was made

was sought from the replies to the questionnaires which might be revealed either in the name given the course or in its stated purposes and objectives.

While the names of courses listed in college catalogues do not necessarily reveal course content, they may have some interest as an index to the emphasis placed upon the various aspects of human behavior in the courses offered in the Southwest. Some of the names given in the data received from the questionnaires sent out in the Southwest are these:

The Making of the Modern World
Major Problems of American Society
Contemporary Problems and Institutions
Introduction to Social Science
American Institutions
Social Science Survey
Problems of Modern Society
Development of American Institutions
Study of Western Civilization
Man and the Social World
Man in Society
Great Issues

When the course outlines and reading lists are examined in addition to noting official names or titles, the courses offered in this area are found to conform fairly closely to the patterns noted in other investigations. Mr. Levi in his study¹² notes four primary types of general courses:

1. A history course masquerading as an introduction to the social studies.
2. A survey of social problems which takes various social evils as central.
3. A joint course consisting of separate parts and sampling of the different social sciences.
4. A course which presents a systematic description of contemporary society.

Professor McGrath in editorializing on "Trends in General Courses in Social Science" classifies such courses in *Social Science in General Education* into roughly six types of organization, but they are essentially the same as those in the above group, or a combination of those. From a rather hasty study of the material on social science courses taught in the Southwest it appears that all such courses conform to the patterns described in these studies.

¹²op. cit. p. 12.

Objectives of Courses in Social Science

In attempting to detect the patterns established in the teaching of social science courses, it is sometimes difficult to determine the correlation between the names or titles given to the course, objectives of the course, whether stated explicitly or not, and the subject matter and teaching methods employed by the instructional staff. Not all the replies received from correspondents in this area gave full information, including stated objectives; so that a report is made on only a few of the fuller, more explicit statements.

Objectives of the course: (as stated in one syllabus)

1. To obtain an understanding of those factors in Western culture which have contributed to the distinguishing characteristics of the American way of life.
2. To trace the origin of the major concepts, principles, doctrines, and laws which characterize our government, politics, economics, and social relationships, including the growth of democratic and Christian ideals.
3. To observe ignorance, tyranny, greed, and intolerance in history of Western civilization, and to obtain insights into ways and means of overcoming them.
4. To obtain an integrated conception of social progress in order that various types of cultural events, both in the past and in the present, can be comprehended in relation to one another to the end that one form of cultural product will possess meaning as a sign of the times in relation to other cultural products. To obtain, also, an understanding of why as a nation we do not live in isolation and can no longer function in isolation from the world. Our national life and economy are an integral part of world life and economy. We cannot live without affecting others and others cannot live without affecting us. The welfare of our nation depends upon the welfare of other nations as parts in a common whole.

These objectives are stated in a large manual or syllabus prepared by the staff of a state university to assign a vast array of reading materials in the classics and in modern literature, in history, philosophy, biography, as well as in economics, political science and sociology. The course is called "Western Civilization" and is required of all students. There are no class meetings but students are assigned proctors and are required to report to them regularly. A student may meet the requirement without proctoring, however, if he does the reading and passes satisfactorily the comprehensive examination, which may be taken at the end of the freshman year, but must be taken by the end of the sophomore year. Six semester hours of credit are received toward the satisfaction of the social science group requirement.

Statement on Objectives: (as stated in another syllabus)

To acquaint the student with the nature, methods, and inter-relationships of the social sciences as these pertain to the problems and values of contemporary American social institutions. To bridge the intellectual gaps in the student's knowledge which seem inevitably to result from compartmentalization and from the present segmented curriculum. To increase the student's understanding of the structure, function, and dynamics of the major American institutions; social, political, and economic and the religio-ethical values associated with them. To develop in the student a sense of personal responsibility for effective participation in his society.

These are the stated objectives of a course called "Major Problems of American Society" offered by a state university. They are stated at the top of the first page of a two-page outline of a one semester (3-hours credit) course to follow a course called "Making of the Modern World," a one-semester (4-hours) course. Textbooks are used in both courses: Burns, *Western Civilization* in the freshman course and Atterbury, Auble and Hunt, *Introduction to Social Science* in the sophomore course. A list of supplementary reading (not supplied) is used in each.

In contrast to these two statements of objectives and their implementation is a statement by Professor C. E. Ayres of the University of Texas, who has offered for 12 or 15 years a course to sophomores called "Introduction to Social Science." He says:

I have always operated sans outline, syllabus, reading assignments, everything. Doubtless this procedure began as a matter of temperament; but it has become a matter of conviction. Our teaching suffers sorely from over-organization, I think; as it also suffers (especially in elementary courses) from encyclopedism; a neurotic compulsion to cram a little of everything into the beginning course. My conviction is that such a course should try to help students to think straight and clearly about those few matters by which all subsequent thinking in the social science field will be conditioned: the physical and social aspects of behavior; the institutional and technological aspects of the social heritage; the basic preconceptions underlying the self-regulation-market thinking in economics as distinguished from those underlying institutionalist-under-consumptionist thinking.

Although the quotations above were received from three state universities, there is no overwhelming evidence that they have pioneered in establishing the patterns existing in the teaching of social science in the Southwest. The first data received seemed to indicate that instructors in teachers' colleges and technical schools might be the most conscious of the importance, and of the problems, of integration and the most industrious in solving those problems; but a more complete sampling of all types of institutions of higher learning seems to indicate that there is yet no pronounced pattern in this respect.

Organization of Social Science Courses

The most obvious observation to be made concerning social science courses in the Southwest upon the basis of the limited data available is that every university or college where such courses are offered seems to have developed a highly individualistic pattern of its own, adapted to its own resources and feeling of need. Yet out of all the variety of arrangements and forms of organizations there does evolve some degree of uniformity. Already mentioned is the almost universal characteristic of experimentation and of constant revision of materials and methods. In only a few schools is the course required; in all others it is merely offered or recommended, but credit is accepted in satisfaction of social

science group requirements. In the majority of schools the course is offered for freshmen; in some a two-year course for both freshman and sophomore year is the practice; and in others the course is for sophomores. The credit allowed depends upon the length of time over which the course extends and the number of class hours per week. One semester hour per class hour a week is the general rule; three semester hours for a class meeting three times a week; four for four and in one case five for five. The majority of courses carry six semester hours for two semesters' work (three semester hours per semester). In some schools credit for each semester is independent credit; in others credit for one semester is suspended until credit for the second is received.

Courses are offered by one department (most often history or sociology) or through cooperation of two or more (most often economics, political science and sociology, or some combination of these three) or by a division of social science, either separate from the departments in the specialized fields in the larger school, or composed of teachers of the specialized fields in the smaller schools.

Discussion is stressed as a method in all schools and an attempt to keep classes relatively small (30 to 35 is most often mentioned) is made so that this method may be used. Where the lecture method is used, especially for large groups, it is combined almost invariably with the discussion method by dividing the students into small groups for that purpose. When lectures are combined with discussion periods more than one person is found to be concerned with the course for a single group of students. In the majority of cases, one person teaches the course, in spite of the obvious disadvantages of this and the limitations in training of instructors.

The one institution offering a general course in social science for upper division students reported as follows:

At present we offer a course which we call "Great Issues." This is offered at the senior level and is an attempt to do something about tying together the problems of civilization with which the student has been supposedly struggling for four years. The course is handled via a committee, and is a cooperative affair including many of the faculty. It is offered at night in order to avoid conflicts. Three hours credit is given. The course is required for people choosing the divisional social science major, and is elective for all others. Length of speeches: 40 minutes with three on panel; 60 if two; remainder of time spent in group discussion. Each chairman will be required to hand in a reading report each week and to write a term paper growing out of one of the topics on the schedule. He must confer with some faculty member lecturing on the Great Issues for approval of his research topic and suggestions regarding its treatment.

The questionnaire prepared contained a great many questions about the organizations of the courses offered, but even if the replies had given complete answers, it would have been difficult to present these data statistically. One reply to the questionnaire proposed additional ques-

tions or inquiries which might yield interesting additional knowledge about patterns in social science courses in the Southwest. This reply gave helpful suggestions for further organization of such courses, so it is quoted:

In the "teaching methods" section of the questionnaire I would be interested to know whether book reviews and topical reports are used. And under "materials" I would like to know whether maps are used, what uses are made, whether students make maps. In respect to the "objective tests," I would like to know how scientifically constructed they are: are they purchased or made by trained persons? What visual aids are employed? Do students make field trips of investigation?

In conclusion to this Committee's report, it seems appropriate to quote again from Professor Garnsey's Report and to make an obvious recommendation. Like Professor Garnsey, this Committee feels "that this report is far from complete. At best, it represents merely a preliminary exploration into the problems of the integrated course. Much additional investigation should be made, and this investigation should be a continuing process. Since other social science fields are involved, best results will be obtained through cooperative efforts with representatives of these fields." Professor Garnsey was reporting to members of the American Economics Association. It would seem that the Southwestern Social Science Association, being composed of professional social scientists in all the specialized fields, has an enviable opportunity to pursue this matter further to the profit of all social scientists and to the welfare of students and of education and of society in general.

PATTERNS IN INTEGRATED SOCIAL SCIENCE COURSES IN THE SOUTHWEST

Based upon Information from the following Colleges and Universities:

ARKANSAS

- *Arkansas Polytechnic College
- *Arkansas State College
- *Hendrix College
- *Henderson State College
- *Southern State College
(formerly A&M College)

Russellville
Jonesboro
Conway
Arkadelphia
Magnolia

COLORADO

- *Denver University
- *Colorado A&M
- *Colorado College

Denver
Fort Collins
Colorado Springs

KANSAS

- *University of Kansas
- *Kansas State College
- University of Wichita

Lawrence
Manhattan
Wichita

LOUISIANA

- *Louisiana State University
- *Centenary College of Louisiana
- Louisiana Polytechnic Institute
- Tulane University
- *Northwestern State College

Baton Rouge
Shreveport
Ruston
New Orleans
Natchitoches

MISSOURI

University of Missouri

*Stephens College

Columbia

Columbia

NEW MEXICO

*University of New Mexico

New Mexico Highland University

*New Mexico Western College

New Mexico A&M College

Albuquerque

Las Vegas

Silver City

Las Cruces

OKLAHOMA

*Oklahoma A&M

*Oklahoma City University

Northeastern State College

Tulsa University

Stillwater

Oklahoma City

Tahlequah

Tulsa

TEXAS

*University of Texas

Texas A&M College

*North Texas State College

Texas Technological College

*Southwest State Teachers College

*Southern Methodist University

Texarkana College

Sam Houston State Teachers College

*Texas Christian University

The University of Houston

Austin

College Station

Denton

Lubbock

San Marcos

Dallas

Texarkana

San Marcos

Fort Worth

Houston

Institutions from which no information was available:

University of Kansas City, Kansas City, Missouri

State Teachers College, Kirksville, Missouri

Northeastern State College, Durant, Oklahoma

University of Oklahoma, Norman, Oklahoma

Rice Institute, Houston, Texas

Trinity University, San Antonio, Texas

Texas College of Arts and Industries, Kingsville, Texas

*Indicates those offering an introductory, survey, integrated, or general course.

QUESTIONNAIRE ON SOCIAL SCIENCE COURSES

College or university _____

Name of course _____

Department(s) offering course _____

Extent of course (number of semesters offered) _____

Credit hours per semester _____

Class hours per week _____

Course a prerequisite (not a prerequisite) to _____

Course a requirement (not a requirement) for _____

Level of course: freshman _____ sophomore _____ upperclass _____

Average size of classes _____

Number of classes _____

Teaching methods: Lecture _____ discussion _____ combination _____

of lecture and discussion _____ term papers _____

Materials used: textbook _____ name _____

selection of separate books _____ names _____

anthologies _____ name _____

supplementary reading _____ name _____

syllabi _____

Type of examination: essay _____ objective _____

The Reception of Political Parties into American Political Science

AUSTIN RANNEY

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In the first edition of his famous treatise on the United States, James Bryce complained that in preparing its chapters describing and analysing American political parties, he had been seriously handicapped in not having had

the advantage of being able to cite any previous treatise on the subject; for though the books and articles dealing with the public life of the United States may be counted by the hundreds, I know of no author who has set himself to describe impartially the actual daily working of that part of the vast and intricate political machine which lies outside the Constitution, nor, what are more important still, the influences which sway men by whom this machine has been constructed and is daily manipulated.¹

Had Bryce surveyed the entire literature on American government available in his time, he would have found a few scattered discussions of our party system;² but his general complaint that American scholarship could illuminate the subject very little was eminently justified.

Bryce felt strongly that its failure to deal with the subject of parties was the greatest single deficiency in American political science; for parties, he believed, play a more important role in the American system than anywhere else in the world:

... The spirit and force of party has in America been as essential to the action of the machinery of government as steam is to a locomotive engine . . . In the United States, the actual working of party government is not only full of interest and instruction, but is so unlike what a student of the Federal Constitution could have expected or foreseen, that it is the thing of all others which any one writing about America ought to try to portray . . . In America the great moving forces are the parties. The government counts for less than in Europe, the parties count for more . . .³

Yet in all the voluminous writings produced by Americans about the nature and operation of their government there was little or no comment on political parties. "Since no native American has yet essayed the task of describing the party system of his country," concluded Bryce, "it is better that a stranger should address himself to it, than that the inquiring European should have no means of satisfying his curiosity."⁴

Since Bryce's time, a number of scholars have been struck by the extreme tardiness of the reception of political parties into American

¹*The American Commonwealth* (London, 1889), I, pp. 636-7.

²Most of these will be cited below.

³*Op cit.*, I, pp. 636-8.

⁴*Ibid.*, I, p. 637.

political science. Some of them have speculated about its causes, although none have attempted any extended explanation.⁶ It is the purpose of this essay to fix the time at which American scholars began to write about parties, and to attempt an explanation of the belatedness of their concern with the subject. It is a truism that the nature of any science is most clearly revealed by the kind of questions it asks and the kind of problems it considers worth investigating. Thus an account of why American scholars did not consider parties worth writing about until well after the Civil War, and why they changed their minds about the importance of parties after 1870, should serve to cast some light upon certain aspects of the changing nature of American political science.

The basic explanation for the neglect of parties by American scholars before 1870 lies in the fact that the general nature of American political science in that period was such as to preclude any discussion of parties except an occasional bare and disapproving acknowledgment of their existence. The scholarly works written about American government in this period were of two major types: (1) philosophical-ethical discussions of how government *should* work, and "realistic" descriptions of how it *did* work.⁷ Writers of the first type of analysis, on those occasions when they left the subject of "political ethics" to consider the problems of popular government, were concerned entirely with the question of the merits of democracy, *i. e.*, the question of whether the people are *fit* to rule. Thus they re-debated the classical issues of the people's intelligence and honesty, the desirability of ensuring that voters will have a "stake" in the government, and the stability of democratic government. Apparently the question of *how* the people might rule did not concern either the democrats or the anti-democrats among them. Both sides in the debate on democracy seem to have assumed that once the people's *right* to rule is generally conceded and secured by legal guarantees of the suffrage, then the government will automatically do whatever the popular will requires.⁸

Thus the leading American theorists of democracy were not much interested in the kind of "institutional midwifery" democracy requires,

⁶Cf. E. E. Schattschneider, *Party Government* (New York, 1942), pp. 4-16; F. G. Wilson, *The Elements of Modern Politics* (New York, 1936), pp. 330-1; and C. E. Merriam and H. F. Gosnell, *The American Party System* (New York, 1933), pp. 409-14.

⁷For the titles, relative popularity, and summaries of the contents of the leading American scholarly works on politics in this period, see Anna Haddow's valuable *Political Science in American Colleges and Universities, 1636-1900* (New York, 1939).

⁸For examples of this kind of academic approach to problems of government and democracy, see J. D. Gros, *Natural Principles of Rectitude for the Conduct of Man in All States and Situations of Life* (New York, 1795); J. Witherspoon, *Lectures on Moral Philosophy and Science* (Philadelphia, 1810); and F. Wayland, *The Elements of Moral Science* (New York, 1835).

and even less interested in exploring the nature and assessing the value of political parties. Some approved of parties, and others disapproved. But none felt that parties deserved any very extended discussion. Paine, for example, disposed of the entire subject of parties by a single warning against the evil effects their "intoxicating spirit" might have upon popular government.⁸ Jefferson discussed parties at somewhat greater length, and, on the whole, approved of them. They are, he felt, inevitable in a free society, and "perhaps this party division is necessary to induce each to watch and delate to the people the proceedings of the other."⁹ John Taylor of Caroline, on the other hand, roundly denounced parties as inherently destructive of popular government, since "representation, limited to the alternative of enlisting under one of these parties, ceases to be an instrument of national self-government, and dwindles into an instrument of oppression."¹⁰ The academic successors of these theorists—the Witherspoons and the Waylands—had still less interest in the question of democratic institutional machinery, and none whatever in political parties. In all their considerable writings on the subject of "popular government" parties are not even mentioned.

It would appear, however, that those American scholars who set for themselves the task of describing how the government *did* in fact operate would necessarily have to deal with the subject of parties. Certainly parties were playing an important role in American government as early as the election of 1800. By 1830 the parties had accomplished a basic transformation of the operation of the Electoral College, and were beginning to break down the institution of separation of powers as it had been conceived by the Founding Fathers. Insofar as American government was, in the early part of the nineteenth century, operating in a fashion different from that planned by the Philadelphia Convention, political parties were responsible. Yet he who peruses American scholarly works written before the Civil War which purported to describe how American government was actually working will find almost no recognition of the fact that parties even existed in the United States, let alone any description of the importance of their role in the governing process. Most of these works simply ignored parties and continued to discourse learnedly on such subjects as the formal procedures of the Electoral College and their revision by the Twelfth Amendment. Their authors were apparently unaware of or undisturbed by the fact that those procedures had little importance in an analysis of the actual processes by which the

⁸*Writings*, edited by P. S. Foner (New York, 1945), II, pp. 430, 692.

⁹*Writings*, edited by H. A. Washington (Washington, D. C., 1854), IV, pp. 246, 562; VI, p. 143.

¹⁰*An Inquiry into the Principles and Policy of the Government of the United States* (Fredericksburg, Va., 1814), p. 196. See also E. T. Mudge, *The Social Philosophy of John Taylor of Caroline* (New York, 1939), pp. 146-50.

President was being elected.²¹ A few scholars briefly acknowledged the existence of parties, condemned them as something with which no honest and patriotic man would associate, and proceeded with their analysis in strictly legalistic and formalistic terms as though they had exhausted this rather distasteful subject. Thus Chancellor Kent, in his only reference to parties, made the astonishing observation that popular control of the Electoral College is a good thing, since it prevents combinations of the Electors for selfish party purposes.²² Mr. Justice Story referred to party in two places. In one he observed that "it is notorious" that the Electoral

College is controlled by parties, a development which he lamented as a dangerous subversion of the Constitution. In the other reference, he warned against the time when party will influence the deliberations of legislators:

If ever the day shall arrive, in which the best talents and the best virtues shall be driven from office by intrigue or corruption, by the ostracism of the press, or the still more unrelenting persecution of party, legislation will cease to be national. It will be wise by accident, and bad by system.²³

And William Rawle held that one of the President's primary duties is "to discourage and prevent the artifices of party," condemned party machinations in the Electoral College, and warned against "improper nominations, proceeding from personal or party influence."²⁴

Why did the early "realists" and "descriptionists" among American political scientists largely ignore even the *facts* of parties? The primary cause was their complete and uncritical acceptance of the federalist analysis of politics. Until nearly the end of the nineteenth century the *Federalist* papers were considered by most American political scientists to be repositories of fundamental truths about government—truths which subsequent analysis might perhaps supplement but could never replace or

²¹Cf. J. Bayard, *A Brief Exposition of the Constitution of the United States* (Philadelphia, 1833); E. D. Mansfield, *The Political Grammar of the United States* (New York, 1836); H. Baldwin, *A General View of the Origin and Nature of the Constitution and Government of the United States* (Philadelphia, 1837); A. W. Young, *Introduction to the Science of Government* (Auburn, N. Y., 1854); F. Sheppard, *The Constitutional Textbook* (Philadelphia, 1855); H. Flanders, *An Exposition of the Constitution of the United States* (Philadelphia, 1860); G. W. Paschal, *The Constitution of the United States Defined and Carefully Annotated* (Washington, D. C., 1868); and J. N. Pomeroy, *An Introduction to the Constitutional Law of the United States* (New York, 1868). It should be remembered that, despite their titles, most of these works claimed to be realistic descriptions of how American government actually worked.

²²*Commentaries on American Law*, 5th edition (New York, 1844), I, p. 279.

²³*Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States* (Boston, 1833), II, p. 365.

²⁴*A View of the Constitution of the United States of America*, 2nd edition (Philadelphia, 1829), pp. 50, 57-8, 162.

disprove.¹⁶ Only one aspect of the federalist view of politics need concern us here: Madison's application of it to "factions" in the justly famous tenth paper. Madison, in brief, warned that the greatest danger to liberty and property, and therefore to "republican" government, comes from faction. Factions are particular segments of the community, each with one particular interest; and the sole desire of each is to seize control of the government in order to promote its interest at the expense of all other interests. Despite his fear that disaster would attend the success of any faction, Madison was not willing to propose the outright suppression of all factions as a preventive measure; for that would be tyranny. He rather placed his hopes in a series of legal-constitutional devices intended to make it impossible for one faction to seize control of the entire power of the government: separation of powers, checks and balances, federalism, and extraordinary-majority requirements.¹⁷

For most of the "realists" among American scholars before 1870, this said about all there was to be said about political parties. They had, if anything, even more faith than Madison in the efficacy of purely legal barriers against parties. In fact, the key to understanding their failure to perceive the nature and growing importance of parties in the American system is to recognize the heavily legalistic bias of their approach to the study of politics. They proceeded from the inarticulate premise that one discovers how any government really works by asking, "*What is the law?*" And they believed that the only kind of material worthy of scholarly analysis is that provided by the enactments of legislatures and the decisions of courts. Any student of government who operates from such a methodological base will have enormous difficulty in understanding the nature and operations of political parties; for, as Professor Schattschneider has so justly pointed out, parties "operate in a legal no man's land," with the effect that "the fundamental party arrangements are unknown to the law."¹⁸ Thus the federalist attitude toward politics which dominated the "realists" among American political scientists before the Civil War gave

¹⁶Woodrow Wilson and Henry Jones Ford, the impact of whose writings around the turn of the century did much to displace the federalist tradition, both commented at length upon its dominance over the political science in which they had been trained. Wilson in particular was struck by the fact that, despite the avowedly anti-democratic nature of the federalist point of view, the pro-democrats of his own time nevertheless "punctiliously kept to (federalist) mechanics." *Constitutional Government in the United States* (New York, 1908), p. 203. See also Ford, *The Rise and Growth of American Politics* (New York, 1898), p. 93-4.

¹⁷*The Federalist*, edited by Max Beloff (New York, 1948), pp. 41-8. There is some question as to just what Madison meant by a "faction." In some places he appears to have had in mind what are today called "pressure groups;" in others he seems to have meant political parties. Whatever Madison meant, however, it is clear that most of his federalist disciples for the next century applied the term and his analysis to political parties.

¹⁸*Op. Cit.*, Pp. 11-12.

them an anti-majoritarian bias which kept them from approving of political parties, and a legalistic bias which kept them from understanding either the nature or actual importance of American parties.

Only two well-known scholars of American government before the 1870's made any extended analysis of the American party system—and both were foreign-trained. In 1835 Alexis de Tocqueville devoted 15-odd pages of his great study to a discussion of American parties. Parties in general, he felt, "are a necessary evil in free governments," and he explained much of the history of the United States after 1789 in terms of the conflict between the "aristocratic" (Federalist-Whig) party and the "democratic" (Jeffersonian-Jacksonian) party.¹⁸ Three years later Francis Lieber, who was German-trained and had migrated to the United States only 11 years before, published his *Manual of Political Ethics*, the only work written by a reputable American scholar before 1870 which made a sustained theoretical analysis of the function of parties in a democratic system. His main thesis was that political parties are inevitable in a free society, for wherever freedom of expression and political action exists men will band together in parties in order to make effective their common ideals. It is well that they do so, he continued, for parties perform many useful functions in a democratic government. They provide a "loyal, steady, lasting and effective opposition, one of the surest safeguards of public peace;" they enable many wise measures, which might otherwise remain just good ideas, to be put into law; and they provide an orderly and peaceful means for removing unpopular rulers. To be sure, parties have an unfortunate tendency to lose sight of the principles on which they were founded in favor of the mere love of office. But on the whole, he concluded, parties are valuable institutions in a democratic order, and all good citizens should participate in politics through working inside the parties.¹⁹ In his subsequent works, however, Lieber did not pursue the subject of parties further.²⁰ His only further mention of them came in 1863, when he printed a pamphlet urging all patriots to abandon their party quarrels and unite behind the Union cause.²¹ Otherwise he joined his colleagues in their general silence on parties—a silence that lasted a full 40 years after the publication of his *Manual*.

¹⁸*Democracy in America*, translated by Henry Reeves, edited by Phillips Bradley (New York, 1945), I, pp. 174-80.

¹⁹*Manual of Political Ethics* (Boston, 1838), pp. 413-68.

²⁰See, for example, his *Legal and Political Hermeneutics* (Boston, 1839), and *Civil Liberty and Self-Government* (Philadelphia, 1853), in neither of which does the word "party" appear.

²¹*No Party Now:—but All for Our Country*, pamphlet No. 16 of the Loyal Publication Society (Philadelphia, 1863).

²²*Political Science, or the State Theoretically and Practically Considered* (New York, 1877), II, pp. 542-67.

It was not until the late 1870's that American political scientists began to regard political parties as fit subjects for scholarly investigation. In 1877, President Theodore Dwight Woolsey of Yale devoted an entire chapter of his survey of political science to parties, concluding, like Lieber, that they are inevitable in free societies and that the ordinary citizen can be effective politically only through their agency.²² In the next two years, two well-known publicists, Charles C. P. Clark and Albert Stickney, devoted entire books to the thesis that the very existence of political parties is fatal to genuine popular government, and advanced a number of proposals for controlling or abolishing American parties.²³ In 1879, there appeared the first work of the political scientist who was to make what is still the most thorough and incisive American exposition and defense of the doctrine of responsible party government. Woodrow Wilson, then a senior at Princeton, published an essay advancing this thesis;²⁴ and five years later he more fully developed his position in another article and in his published doctoral dissertation.²⁵ In the 1880's the growing respectability of the discussion of parties was evidenced by the fact that even some textbooks in secondary-school civics began to discuss parties;²⁶ and from that time to our own American political scientists have generally considered parties as both fit and important subjects for investigation. In view of its tardy beginnings, the volume of literature on parties which has accumulated since the 1870's is impressive evidence of the importance which parties are now considered to have.

One question, however, remains unanswered in this account of the reception of political parties into American political science: after so long and so complete a silence on the subject, why did American scholars finally get around to writing about them in the last quarter of the nineteenth century? One answer to this question appears to lie in the emergence of a new kind of practical political issue in the post-Civil War period. To most Americans, including the professional political scientists, the topic of the place of political parties apparently seemed irrelevant to the great and pressing political issues of the pre-war period: extension of the suffrage, extension of slavery, and the constitutional position of the States in the Union. These issues, however, were all largely settled by the war; and the first issue to replace them in the public concern after 1865 was that of corruption in government. Such notorious episodes as

²²Clark, *The Commonwealth Reconstructed* (New York, 1878); and Stickney, *A True Republic* (New York, 1879).

²³"Cabinet Government in the United States," *International Review*, VII (Aug., 1879), pp. 146-63.

²⁴"Committee or Cabinet Government?" *Overland Monthly*, series 2, III (Jan., 1884), pp. 17-33; and *Congressional Government* (Boston, 1885).

²⁵Cf. W. C. Ford, *The American Citizen's Manual* (New York, 1882); and C. Nordhoff, *Politics for Young Americans* (New York, 1882).

the Credit Mobilier affair, the "whiskey ring" scandal, and the "salary grab" aroused the indignation and worry of the general public and the political scientists alike. A number of political scientists undertook the task of discovering the causes of this corruption, and their pursuit of this inquiry led many of them into a consideration of the nature and functions of American parties.²⁷

A much more important pathway to the study of parties, however, was provided by the growing concern of American political scientists with the broader question of *how* the people might rule. The pre-war debate over the people's *fitness* to rule was largely ended by the 1870's. The democrats apparently had won, for while American political scientists were still reluctant to label themselves "democrats," almost all of them proclaimed their conviction that the government should act in close response to the popular will.²⁸ Many of them, however, perceived and were deeply concerned with the paradoxical fact that, despite the apparent general acceptance of the democratic ideal in America, the actual government frequently ignored and even flouted the people's wishes instead of always obeying them. In their effort to understand and resolve this paradox, American scholars were brought face to face with the very question they had neglected for so long: What kind of institutional machinery is necessary to translate the popular will faithfully and effectively into governmental action? An ever-increasing number of American political scientists after 1870 took up the task of examining the institutions which existed for doing the job and of assessing their actual and potential value as agencies for establishing genuine democratic government. Political parties shortly became the principal objects of such analyses.²⁹

Thus American political scientists first became interested in political parties as possible solutions to the problem of democratic institutional machinery; and the early scholarly discussion of parties was of a largely

²⁷For examples of this approach to the study of parties, see C. F. Dole, *The American Citizen* (Boston, 1892); and J. H. Patton, *Political Parties in the United States: Their History and Influence* (New York, 1896).

²⁸Charles A. Beard observed that "democracy," as a word describing government by popular majorities, did not become widely accepted in the United States until Woodrow Wilson made it a battle-cry in the 1914-1918 war: *The Republic* (New York, 1946), pp. 27-33. The *idea* that such a government is proper for America, however, seems by 1870 to have been generally accepted by most American political scientists. To describe such a government they customarily employed such terms as "popular government" and "free government."

²⁹For examples of this approach to the study of parties, see Wilson, *op. cit.*; Henry Jones Ford, *op. cit.*; Frank J. Goodnow, *Politics and Administration* (New York, 1900); A. Lawrence Lowell, *Essays on Government* (Boston, 1889); S. E. Moffett, *Suggestions on Government* (New York, 1894); and J. S. Brown, *Partisan Politics: the Evil and Remedy* (Philadelphia, 1897).

theoretical and evaluative nature. Most of the literature on the subject produced since 1900, however, has been primarily descriptive and non-theoretical, apparently written on the assumption that the function of the political scientist is to discuss American parties as they are, and not to speculate about how they ought to be. In the past ten years, there has occurred an interesting and important revival of the kind of approach to parties which characterized the literature of the last quarter of the nineteenth century—an approach which is primarily concerned with developing a picture of what political parties ought to do in a democratic order, and then measuring the existing American party system against that ideal picture.²

The American political scientists of our own time would therefore seem to be learning what their predecessors of 70 years ago discovered: that the problem of *how* the people are to rule is crucial to any consideration of democratic government, and that he who is concerned with achieving more effective and more democratic government in the American system cannot escape the task of examining in this regard the past record, present operation and future possibilities of political parties.

²See, for example, E. P. Herring, *The Politics of Democracy* (New York, 1940); E. E. Schattschneider, *op. cit.*; J. M. Burns, *Congress on Trial* (New York, 1949); and, perhaps most significant of all, the recently-published report of the Committee on Political Parties of the American Political Science Association: "Toward a More Responsible Two-party System," *The American Political Science Review* (supplement), XLIV (Sept., 1950), No. 3, Part 2.

Academic Training in Salesmanship

RALPH B. THOMPSON

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Few people have begun teaching business administration in a small school—or marketing at a large one—without finding themselves scheduled for a class in salesmanship. “Here,” says the typical dean or departmental chairman, “is a place I can give this green teacher a chance to get some practice teaching without too much harm befalling the students.”

Perhaps, if I were to become a departmental chairman I would acquire their pattern of thinking, but at present it is my sincere conviction that salesmanship is perhaps the *most*, rather than the *least*, important course in the marketing curriculum. Let me suggest a few reasons why I think that salesmanship should be given a higher billing in the business administration show than it now gets in most schools.

The Importance of Salesmanship

In the first place, the selling function is of top importance in a competitive economy. Without vigorous efforts to gain sales, competition tends to succumb to monopolistic pricing agreements, schemes for restriction of output, and other devices that work for the preservation of the status quo. The experience of Europe has proved, I believe, that the result of such developments is a demand for central planning. If central planning is to be done in a democratic society, it must be done by the representatives of the people, as in England, or democracy is lost, as in Nazi Germany or the Soviet Union. So I contend that without competition, socialism is inevitable.

Now I recognize that competition consists in more than just effective salesmanship, but the sales point-of-view is one of its chief motivating forces and our students should see this. Will the new, untried teacher conceive of his class in salesmanship as an opportunity to show his students this idea?

Another point in this connection is that the salesman is one of the agents that makes a private enterprise economy dynamic. Higher sales lead to a greater incentive to invest, greater investments create new jobs, new jobs provide more income, and more income leads once again to higher sales.

The second reason for the importance of salesmanship is that it leads to career opportunities. With more than three and one half million people classified as salesmen in 1940, plus thousands of proprietors, managers, agents, advertising people and others who are engaged in selling to a greater or lesser extent, is it no wonder that so many of our graduates in business find themselves starting their professional life as salesmen?

Not only do many of our graduates go into selling, but those that do are well rewarded financially. Many surveys have been made that show that men engaged in sales and sales management are top income producers.

Two more reasons for giving salesmanship a more important place in the curriculum are (1) that a knowledge of the basic principles of salesmanship is essential to an understanding of other business courses, and (2) that the ability to persuade is one which everyone should possess whether or not he uses that ability in a commercial way.

For example, not only should one studying sales management, advertising, retailing, or other marketing courses know the principles of selling, but people majoring in accounting, finance and management should be familiar with them as well, since much of their work is related to sales.

Furthermore, every college graduate is faced with the problem of securing employment. To do so scientifically requires an analysis of his capabilities, a task not unlike that in which a salesman acquires product knowledge. The necessity of finding the right kind of job in the right location from the point of view of the applicant's interests and experience is comparable with the salesman's task of prospecting. To present his case effectively to a prospective employer is a persuasion problem very similar to that of demonstrating a sales proposition. In other words, to be able to "sell oneself" is a valuable trait.

In addition, I would go so far as to say that a course in salesmanship has cultural value. In what other business school course is there a similar opportunity to focus the thinking of the class on the need for, and methods of, developing good personality traits and seeking means of character development? Here is one place where the good old-fashioned virtues can be favorably contrasted with the modern desire for "security."

The Objectives of Teaching Salesmanship

These rambling remarks can be summarized into a statement of objectives for a course in Salesmanship which would run something like this:

1. Salesmanship should aid the student in understanding the functioning of our economic system by describing and illustrating the role of effective selling in the process. In accomplishing this aim a salesmanship class can be compared with a principles course in any field such as marketing, advertising, retailing, or industrial management.
2. Salesmanship should prepare the student for a career in selling. Here its objective is similar to that of such courses as accounting, advertising, statistics, or such non-business courses as journalism, architecture or engineering.

3. Salesmanship is a tool course that provides background knowledge for other courses, in a similar manner as do business writing, public speaking or any course in the basic sciences.

4. Salesmanship should aid the student in learning how to get along in the world just as do literature, music appreciation, ethics or philosophy. Therefore, salesmanship should be taught by men who see its value and who are effective experienced instructors.

The Content of a Salesmanship Course

Some may take issue with this list of objectives, but assuming agreement what should a course in salesmanship contain in order to accomplish these aims?

To accomplish the first objective, it must show through the historical and descriptive approaches just how salesmanship contributes to the smooth functioning of our economy both theoretically and practically.

To prepare the student for a job in selling, the course should present the basic principles of salesmanship and give him practice in applying them to various types of situations. It is my belief these principles are few and simple. The reason most salesmanship texts are so large is not that there is so much to say, but rather that the teachers, because of inexperience or large sections, cannot plan any other kind of class activity except reading and recitation. The principles of selling are of three kinds: those concerned with understanding the customer, those directed toward acquiring knowledge of the product, and those patterns of behavior and thought which the salesman himself must strive to acquire in order to be able to communicate his ideas to others effectively.

One more thing should be done to carry out the aim of preparing for a career and that is to offer the student facts about careers in selling, the types of selling jobs available, and suggestions of other courses that he should take to properly equip himself for the job of his choice.

The carrying out of the first two objectives will, I think automatically accomplish the last two.

Methods of Teaching Salesmanship

The next problem is that of method. As I hinted above, here is where salesmanship instruction often falls down. Yet the teacher of salesmanship has a greater opportunity to experiment with new and different techniques of instruction than instructors in many other subjects.

Of course, the lecture and discussion have their places in the sales class. Due to the widespread interest of business firms in teaching the principles

of salesmanship to their employees, however, there is available a great variety of audio-visual aids that can be had which provide stimulating and interesting variations in class presentation. Many of these materials may be borrowed from business concerns or may be rented at small cost from film libraries.

Salesmanship is a highly active pursuit and it seems incongruous to teacher and student alike to try and get along without active individual student participation, where the class is small enough to permit it. Here, certain inherent limitations begin to operate. When you attempt to give a student practical problems to do in accounting or statistics you can go a long way in duplicating real-life conditions. I have found from my own experience that if you give to a class in marketing research a real business or community problem, they can formulate the hypotheses, select a random sample, interview the respondents, tabulate and analyze the results, and write individual reports which are as good as the sponsor would have gotten had he hired a commercial agency. But when you try to set up problems in salesmanship for students, you become immediately aware of the fact that you cannot easily introduce real prospects, and that the student has neither the time, the incentive, nor the opportunity to acquire the amount of product knowledge that a good salesman would have to have. Experiments have been made in which real commercial selling propositions have been utilized as class exercises. However, such a plan does present problems of ethics, of student evaluation, and of time consumption, which usually prove to be insoluble.

In order, then, to get individual student participation it is usually necessary to do a great deal of what the army calls simulation. I am going to outline briefly the procedure that we have used at the University of Texas—not because I think it is the best there is—but rather because we attempted to plan it objectively and continue to carry it on in an experimental spirit. Here are the highlights of our plan!

1. The class is held from 7 to 10 in the evening in order to provide not only three uninterrupted hours of activity, but also, and *primarily*, to permit us to use in its instruction professional salesmen who can bring to the class their years of experience and their practical point of view. At present we have as lecturers: the director of training for an insurance company whose home office is in Austin, the sales manager of a local wholesale grocery house, and a man who has had 30 years of experience in institutional selling of the highest order.

2. Our procedure is to divide the semester into two parts. During the first six or seven weeks, each three hour session also has two parts. For an hour or so, the different members of the staff lecture to the entire class which often has been as large as 150 members. Movies and slide

films are shown, where they fit into the topical sequence. During the second part of the evening, individual groups of from 25 to 30 members with one of the instructors permanently in charge of each, have a laboratory session devoted to discussion and demonstrations. Students are assigned to sections depending on their selection of either a tangible or an intangible product to work with.

3. During the last half of the semester each student makes an individual sales demonstration before his small group with the instructor as prospect. He chooses his own product and must prepare a sales manual on it before he makes his oral demonstration. The instructor assumes the role of whatever type of prospect the student desires him to be. Each presentation is rated by all the other students as well as by the instructor. An objective type rating scale is used. We have found we can have about five such presentations each evening.

Sales Curriculum

So far I have been talking about the one course in salesmanship which most schools offer. What of the student who knows or thinks he is going to go into selling work after graduation? Should a special course of study be arranged? Back in 1947, Mr. R. S. Wilson, Vice-President of the Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company, wrote an article on this subject for *Sales Management* magazine. (Wilson, Robert S., "What Kind of College Training for Career in Sales?", *Sales Management*, December 15, 1947.) In it he reports on a survey made of some 20 colleges in which one of the questions asked was: "If a man enters your school with the avowed purpose of becoming a salesman what courses would you recommend he take"?

There were three kinds of answers given. One group said that their schools did not train salesman as such—only business administrators. The second group said they would recommend a general business course. The third group would suggest a specific course of study. Mr. Wilson, of course, recommends the last point-of-view. If he, as a spokesman for industry, suggests the desirability of a sales curriculum, perhaps we as teachers of business should consider the introduction of the same.

Now Mr. Wilson, in his article, sets up certain criteria and then suggests the courses that would achieve those standards. Let us go back to the objectives already determined and see what kind of a curriculum we would come out with.

The first one we mentioned was to show the role of salesmanship in the economic system. If we are to look for a whole course on this subject, then probably one in business economics would fit the bill.

The second objective was the teaching of the principles of salesmanship, and we noted that there were three types of principles. What courses would we suggest to our embryonic salesman to help him understand the customer? Well, obviously, psychology and also sociology, because we are being told increasingly by sociologists that we cannot really begin to understand what motivates people to buy if we do not study the influence of group behavior and thought patterns.

Now as to product knowledge we are more limited. Those who want to sell industrial goods need some technical background, of course. We find that students who take the combined engineering-business program are eagerly sought by industrial goods manufacturers for sales positions. They are not left much time from engineering and business courses, however, for work in psychology and other fields. Students who want to sell insurance, real estate, investments, advertising space or time, or similar services, can find courses right in the business school to aid them in acquiring product knowledge. For the rest, we must be content, I believe, with teaching them the type of things they should know about a product and how to go about informing themselves and hope they can remember the principles when the time comes.

As to knowledge of oneself and training in personality and character development, the possibilities are not so clear cut. Mr. Wilson suggests four years of literature to develop vocabulary, a course in biography to inspire integrity, or what we spoke of a while ago as cultivation of the old fashioned virtues, and courses in mathematics or logic to help increase the capacity of students to think.

Mr. Wilson seems blissfully unaware of the tight little fences that we academicians have built around our respective fields of knowledge, and I am sure he has never tried to persuade a business major to take extra English or math. He also overlooks the fact that character development is not an objective of the modern, secular university. To many modern thinkers, "good" and "bad" are irrelevant terms. Furthermore, insofar as the state school interprets or, in my own personal opinion, misinterprets its relation to religion, and insofar as religious conviction is a prerequisite to character development, we must perforce be circumspect in dealing with important aspects of sales training. Perhaps those who teach in church-related schools are more fortunate in that they can discuss Christian ethics publically without being considered violators of the constitution, as interpreted by the present Supreme Court, or without being labelled "unscientific" by more positivistic colleagues.

However, it seems to me that the trend of present day thinking is more in the direction of inter-disciplinary cooperation than it was 20 or even ten years ago. Eventually, we can hope to do more in helping our

students develop their whole selves instead of just their brains. Until we do that we cannot do a thorough job of training salesmen—or may I suggest—of accountants, advertising men, bankers, personnel managers or members of any other profession, either.

Meanwhile, we should be thinking of developing a distinctive curriculum for prospective salesmen that is more clearly defined to both student and future employers alike than the present programs in "general marketing," and go as far afield as necessary and possible to obtain the variety of courses required.

I suspect we have to admit that business administration would not be a social science today, but rather an area in which many of the social sciences—and the humanities and the arts too—can be applied, if people in other fields had not missed the boat. Wherever teachers in an established field have failed to make these applications, they have lost jurisdiction. Thus, marketing broke away from economics, personnel management evolved out of psychology, and industrial management disassociated itself from engineering. Where business schools cannot get cooperation from other disciplines in supplying the specific courses needed, then this splitting off process will have to continue as they hire and train their own specialists.¹

To summarize, salesmanship is an important course, it has a content that is academically respectable, and is taught by methods that are both dramatic and effective. To go further and provide a curriculum in salesmanship is desirable. Such a curriculum would be broad and require the cooperation of other disciplines. If these are not forthcoming business schools must seek to supply the material themselves.

Bibliography: Beach, Frank H., and Wales, Hugh G., "Objectives for Salesmanship Courses" *Journal of Marketing*, Vol. XIV, No. 4, January, 1950, 587ff.; Cox, Richard W., "Comments on a University Course in Salesmanship", *Journal of Marketing*, Vol. XIII, No. 3, January, 1949, 366 ff.; Heidingsfield, Myron, "College Training of Professional Salesmen", *Collegiate News and Views*, Vol. IV, No. 2, December, 1950, 1 ff.; Wilson, Robert S., "What Kind of College Training in Sales?" *Sales Management*, Dec. 15, 1947.

¹It is interesting to note that psychologists, sociologists, economists, geographers, resources specialists, accountants and statisticians, as well as marketing men are contributing their techniques and findings to the field of marketing research. This, it seems to me, is indicative of the newer trend in inter-disciplinary cooperation which many hope will help bring about more academic cooperation, better integrated instructors and less bickering and rivalry between schools and departments within a college or university.

Exhibit 1

PERSONAL SALESMANSHIP

Typical One-Semester Class Schedule, Dept. of Marketing,
University of Texas

Week	Lecture Period, 7-8:30 p. m. (Entire group meets together)	Laboratory Period, 8:45-10:00 (Individual sections of 20-30 students)
1. Lecture:	<i>Orientation</i> —The instructor's Motion Picture on "Salesmanship"	
Homework:	For week 2, read text: Introduction and Chapter on <i>Buying Motives</i>	
2. Lecture:	<i>Buying Motives</i> A motion picture on "Why People Buy." Formation of sections	Final Orientation
Homework:	For week 3, read chapters on <i>Product Knowledge</i>	
3. Lecture:	<i>Product Knowledge</i> Sound slide film on "Product Knowledge"	
Homework:	Assignment and discussion of Product Outline	Preparation for the sale
4. Lecture:	For week 4, read Chapter on <i>Prospecting</i>	
Homework:	<i>Prospecting</i> Sound slide film on "Prospecting"	Techniques of prospecting
5. Lecture:	For week 5, read Chapter on <i>Approach</i>	
Homework:	<i>The Approach</i> Motion Picture on "The Approach"	Practice the approach
6. Lecture:	For week 6, read Chapter on <i>Selling Steps</i>	
Homework:	<i>The Demonstration</i> Motion Picture on "The Demonstration"	Practice the demonstration
7. Lecture:	For week 7, read chapter on <i>Overcoming Objections and Closing</i>	
Homework:	<i>Overcoming Objections</i> Closing the Sale Slide film on Closing	Practice Closing
8. Lecture:	For week 8, read chapter on <i>Follow-up and Goodwill</i>	
Homework:	<i>Follow-up and Goodwill</i> Collection of Product Outline and assignment of term papers	Professional demonstration of selling by experienced salesmen
9-14	Read rest of book	
Homework:	Individual laboratory groups meet for full three hours each week for sales presentations by each student in turn. Ratings and criticisms to be made by instructor and other class members.	
15.	Weeks 9 through 14, prepare individual sales presentations and write papers on selecting and obtaining a job in selling.	
	Exam over readings, lectures, and films	

Book Reviews

Edited by H. MALCOLM MACDONALD

T. CUYLER YOUNG, (Ed.): *Near Eastern Culture and Society*. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1951, Pp., 250 \$4.00.)

If a teacher of history or international relations in an American college would be asked which books to recommend to his students as basic required reading on the Near East, he is fortunate enough to be able to recommend two outstanding works for this purpose. One is George E. Kirk, *A Short History of the Near East from the Rise of Islam to Modern Times* (Washington, 1949), the other is this new Symposium on the Meeting of East and West here reviewed. It is divided into two parts, of which the first deals with Islamic art, literature, science and religion as they became known to the West in recent centuries and analyzed and understood by Western scholarship. Thus it surveys the West's meeting with the spiritual heritage of the East. But while the West received only the impact of Near Eastern thought, the East underwent a twofold influence, that of Western thought and that of Western policy. The second part of the book deals therefore with the current problems of the Near Eastern peoples as they have been produced by the interaction of Islamic and Western thought and by political and international events in the last decades in Turkey, Persia and the Arab speaking countries. All the essays are concentrating on the present or the very recent past and are written by authorities in the field.

The modern meeting of the Near East with the West began in the times of Napoleon whose influence made itself felt at about the same time in Egypt (which through it aspired to become the leader of the Arab and Islamic world), in Turkey and in Persia. Yet the interaction between Western and Islamic thought has not yet penetrated to a deeper level of consciousness and conscience, and it is this insufficient foundation which is responsible for the weakness of the nationalist movement which sprang up recently throughout the Near East under the impact of the West. Professor H. A. R. Gibb of Oxford University remarks not without justice in his concluding observations that "the overall picture today is full of deep shadows, and fills many an observer with despair. Only by standing a little further back can we perceive and try to estimate the significance of the lighter strokes that relieve the general soberness of tone."

To the present reviewer the two articles by Habib Amin Kurani on "The Interaction of Islamic and Western Thought in the Arab World" and by T. Cuyler Young on "The National and International Relations of Iran" seem of outstanding value for the fairness and critical insight which they display. Mr. Kurani rightly draws the attention to the

great deficiency in national higher education in the Mohammedan countries and stresses the weaknesses in present Arab nationalism. "At no other time in their history," he writes, "have the Arabs been in greater need of wise, determined and unselfish leadership to guide them through the maze of conflicting interests to their goal of freedom, enlightenment and well-being than today." It was not the pressure of "imperialist powers" but the intrinsic moral and political weakness of Arab nationalism which prevented Arab unity and caused the Arab defeat by as small a country as Israel. The Arabs even today as shows the example of Egypt, have not learned the lesson. They prefer noisy demonstrations and rhetorical declarations against imperialism to the much more arduous but fruitful task of self criticism and continuous hard work in self improvement. The same is true of Iran. Professor Young points out in a very felicitous sentence: "One of the greatest weaknesses of Iran is her romanticising tendency to see (the) hard reality of foreign interest out of focus, to the dimming of her own responsibility . . . Iranian nationalism is not wholly free from grandiose dreams of irredentism and empire . . . One would not deny a people their dreams but these should have some relation to present realities and possibilities." It is true that it was Western ineptitude which precipitated the crises in Palestine, Iran and Egypt in recent times, and the basic cause of this ineptitude has been the refusal of the Americans and the British to cooperate closely and to understand that their interests in the Near East as everywhere else have become entirely identical in the twentieth century. This Western ineptitude makes it more difficult for the Near Eastern peoples—as also for the Russians and the Asians—to grasp the basic attitudes of the West.

City College of New York Hans Kohn

EDMUND H. VOLKART (Ed): *Social Behavior and Personality: Contributions of W. I. Thomas to Theory and Research*. (New York: Social Science Research Council, 1951, Pp., 337, \$3.00.)

Volkart has produced a competent digest, a sufficient collection, and a very limited commentary. W. I. Thomas thought that formal methodological studies are relatively unprofitable; there is sufficient grounds for the belief that he held "systematic" sociologies and social psychologies to be of even lesser value. He was a problem finder, a problem facer and a problem tussler who could weld theory to observation. It matters very little now that in the Blumer appraisal and panel committee comment on *The Polish Peasant* the sources of posited generalizations could not be located specifically in the data from which they presumably came. All one has to do is to put the methodological notes in *The Polish Peasant* down beside something of that day from Giddings, Albion Small, or McDougall—or even Mead or Cooley. Where are the problems which define what the scholars and researchers have done and now do?

Volkart may try a little too hard to make Thomas' contributions consequent and unified. Very carefully he excerpts sentences and parts of sentences as he tries systematic analysis of Thomas' basic theory. Dredging Thomas raw, for example in the theory of *The Unadjusted Girl* or that of *Old World Traits Transplanted* (which Volkart publicly restores to Thomas), gives a different picture. He could leave theory at horrible loose ends and do some strange grafting of ideas to ideas. And, no amount of elaboration can go beyond Park's conclusion that "Thomas, so far as I know, has never made a wholly adequate statement of what he means by 'the definition of the situation.'"

But here are the core items of Thomas' own writing to speak for themselves—the familiar published writing, some of the out-of-the-way things like the important paper in the Swann symposium, and some that were previously unpublished. Before Thomas becomes a completely historical figure two tasks remain. First, there is the task which Fay Karpf started 20 years ago in *American Social Psychology*, or was it Floyd House in *The Range of Social Theory*? That is, to write a thorough critique of the Thomas theories. Second, there is the task which John Markey began in *Trends in American Sociology* of relating the experientialism and situationalism of Thomas to gestalt theory—for example, the phenomenology and field theory of Kurt Lewin. Markey thought Thomas' situationalism diminished the direct contribution of gestalt theory to American social psychology. But now, and it is not an unmixed blessing, there is more of Lewin's gestalt theorizing than Thomas' situationalism in social psychology—that is, unless they are now fused. The why of this, carefully explored, would do much to reinforce the contributions of two outstanding minds.

Oklahoma A. and M. College

Paul B. Foreman

THEODORE SALOUTOS AND JOHN D. HICKS: *Agricultural Discontent in the Middle West 1900-1939*. (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1951, Pp., 581, \$6.75.)

This work is the outgrowth of Professor Hicks' seminars in the 1930s at the University of Wisconsin and Professor Saloutos' dissertation at the same institution. Its approach is strictly historical in the sense that little attempt of analysis is made of this important—and too much neglected—segment of American politics. The material is drawn from a wide variety of sources, more being taken from the rural and farm organization press than elsewhere. The book is written in a highly readable style and the University of Wisconsin Press has made a handsome volume of it.

The most valuable parts of the book are those chapters which deal with twentieth century farm organizations. The discussions of the

American Society of Equity and the Nonpartisan League are the best that are available. The chapters on the Farmers' Union and the American Farm Bureau Federation are less satisfactory. The chapter on the Farm Strike of 1933 is vivid and not duplicated elsewhere.

Although the authors' topic is explicitly agrarian discontent, there is some risk that the work may be mistaken for a history of agricultural politics in the Middle West. Unfortunately, the book has serious limitations as such a history. While discontent was manifestly a characteristic of the first four decades of twentieth century farm politics, preoccupation with this obscures sight of the highly significant shift in agrarian movements from a liberal and progressive character to something very nearly the opposite. It also precludes insight into the remarkable development of political power that took place in the period and the region with which the book is concerned. There is, as a result, little discussion in the chapters on New Deal farm policy of the schism in that policy or its relation to farm organizations. There is no indication of the roles played by the land-grant colleges and the Department of Agriculture in the political structure.

With these qualifications, this is a very useful and informative volume on the crucial time and area in agrarian politics.

University of California

Grant McConnell

BERNARD FRANK AND ANTHONY NETBOY: *Water, Land, and People*. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1950, Pp., 329, \$4.00.)

No recent book on the conservation of natural resources aimed at the general public succeeds in giving a more balanced presentation of the importance of renewable resources. Unlike some writers in this field who are obsessed by neo-Malthusian doctrines or who otherwise use the cause of conservation to crusade for a pet theory or project, authors Frank and Netboy have stayed close to the best scientific knowledge and evidence available and have carefully refrained from drawing unwarranted conclusions designed to frightened their readers into accepting their point of view.

The focus for the conservation and development of renewable resources in this book is the watershed. The authors show that every region of this country, metropolitan or rural, humid or semi-arid, must fit its programs for stream control, land use, vegetation cover, and the preservation of fish and wildlife into the watershed plan. This calls for an approach which views respective resources in terms of multiple use, and for undertakings of resource development and rehabilitation which are highly integrated. Agriculturists, engineers, foresters, and other professionals who see resource problems primarily in terms of food production, flood control, forest crops, or some other single

objective have no place in this pattern and by their jurisdictional conflict are retarding the conservation movement.

Despite some excellent conservation achievements during the past two decades, the authors make clear by their use of statistics that we still have a long way to go before the nation's resource base is adequately protected. Indeed, as they view the work of the National Resources Planning Board, the CCC, the WPA, etc., concern is expressed that the drive for conservation exhibited during the 1930's has been lost. Furthermore, criticism of existing programs is not spared. The TVA has not given sufficient attention to watershed planning and "is resting too easily on its engineering laurels and test demonstration and allied accomplishments." Subsidy payments of the Department of Agriculture have not been effectively used to promote conservation. The Forest Service has not been sufficiently "watershed-management conscious," and the competition between the Corps of Engineers and the Bureau of Reclamation over construction of stream projects is indicted.

Neither the valley authority nor any other single device is regarded as a panacea; constructive steps for conservation must be taken on several fronts: more research and investigation of resource data; better overall planning; more attention to upstream watershed control; restrictions upon the right of private owners to abuse their lands; extension of public ownership in critical areas; and finally a concerted attack through education to reduce the area of public apathy and ignorance.

University of California at Los Angeles Ernest A. Engelbert

RONALD A. ANDERSON: *Government Regulation of Business*. (Cincinnati: South-Western Publishing Co., 1950, Pp., 694, \$4.50.)

One of the most obvious features of the Twentieth Century is the rapid growth and expansion of government regulation of business and the general economy. Regulation through classical economics was very simple. Let supply and demand regulate market price and cost of production would regulate normal or long run prices, while flexible prices would, like "an invisible hand," guide industry and allocate scarce resources and men. *Laissez-faire* suffices. But rugged individualism all too often brought "ragged individualism"—witness 1930-32—Therefore, modern man has called in political forces to supplement (or supplant) economic forces by the device of government regulation.

For this reason, if the modern college student is to understand our economic order, it is quite as essential to offer courses in government regulation as in Marshallian equilibrium economics. In response to this shift of emphasis, it is also essential that textbooks be written on this subject. That is what Mr. Anderson says he has attempted to do. So the reviewer will appraise the book as a textbook for a college course in Government Regulation of Business.

On this point, the author states, "Too often the texts have been little more than compilations of statistics or technical statements of the law that served more to confuse than to clarify. This book has been written to meet this difficulty."

The book is well organized. Especially excellent is Part III on "Regulation of Business." Here, we find chapters dealing with Regulation of Commerce, Combinations, Carriers and Communications; Regulation of Business Practices, Production, Labor, Agriculture, and Banking. Included also are chapters on Taxing Power and Eminent Domain.

However, this work is not well adapted for class use. Mr. Anderson is a Philadelphia lawyer (a member of the Bar) and Professor of Law and Government at Drexel Institute. The book is written solely from the legal point of view. It follows the "Case Method." (There are 138 law cases treated in the book) and the most common form is for the author to introduce the subject with a brief paragraph, then follow with a long excerpt from the majority opinion of the Supreme Court. Without attempting a mathematical count, the reviewer deems it safe to say that at least two-thirds of the book consists of verbatim quotations from court opinions. The cases chosen are excellent, and, of course, no better authority could be found than a Supreme Court decision. This makes the work a very valuable source book. It should be in every library where a course is given on government regulation. But a mosaic of Supreme Court decisions pieced together by a few introductory remarks is not a textbook. It is a law book for law students and is not adapted to the students normally enrolled in Economics or Business Administration for a course in government regulation of business.

Louisiana State University

H. L. McCracken

IVOR THOMAS: *The Socialist Tragedy*. (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1951, Pp., 254, \$2.75.)

Those interested in the dissension over the compatibility of socialism with democracy and economic wellbeing will find *The Socialist Tragedy* profitable reading. It presents clearly the arguments against socialism while avoiding much of the abstract theorizing featured by anti-socialist literature of the Hayekian variety.

Ivor Thomas is a disaffected British Labour M. P. who crossed the aisle to the Conservative side. His emphasis is, as would be expected, on socialism in its English setting. While his book contains that strong and wholesale disapproval of a doctrine recently abandoned to be expected from the disillusioned, it is not distorted by the virulent denunciation which, at least from a scholarly viewpoint, frequently destroys the value of criticism by such persons.

The major arguments presented rest on what Mr. Thomas considers to be the outstanding aims of socialism; (1) public ownership of the means of production, distribution and exchange, (2) elimination of private income derived from rent, interest or profit and (3) central planning of the economic activities of the state. These, he declares, must inevitably lead to the destruction of liberty and parliamentary democracy, as well as to a decrease in productivity. Socialism, he insists, runs counter to human nature and cannot, therefore, operate in a free state or efficiently.

One weakness in the books stems from the author's initial effort to establish that socialism, apart from its tactics for attaining power, is identical with Soviet Communism because both doctrines demonstrate similar attitudes toward ownership, income and planning. This is more a criticism of the approach than the content. After seeing his arguments fully developed the reader can understand by what route Mr. Thomas arrives at this conclusion. However, the initial impression is that the author is among those who uncritically accept the identity of any type of socialism with Soviet Communism and who take no cognizance of the differences in spirit animating Communism and democratic socialism.

Mr. Thomas also accepts, without a satisfactory demonstration of its accuracy, the premise that socialism means a totally socialized state. Undoubtedly many socialists make sweeping declarations for socialization but there remains room for differences of opinion on how far such movements as British socialism actually seek to go and on how far socialization must go.

Texas Legislative Council

Thomas I. Dickson, Jr.

HANSON W. BALDWIN: *Great Mistakes of the War*. (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1950, Pp., 114, \$1.50.)

This book is concerned with American wartime mistakes which were essentially political or which, while military, had significant implications for international politics. Military decisions which had no political consequence are ignored.

The principal thesis is that the United States "fought to win—period," neglecting the problem of establishing a basis for a satisfactory peace. Supplementing this error, there were misconceptions of Soviet intentions: that the Kremlin might make a separate peace with Germany, that it might refuse to give aid against Japan, and that in the post-war period it would be cooperative.

From these fundamental errors others flowed: (1) the demand for the unconditional surrender of Germany; (2) rejection of Churchill's arguments for an invasion of the continent along the "Belgrade-Warsaw axis"; (3) failure to take advantage of opportunities to gain a stronger position in central Europe, particularly a secure corridor to Berlin; (4)

the decision that Soviet help against Japan was necessary and that, to obtain it, concessions should be made to the Kremlin at the expense of China; and (5) the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, described as quite unnecessary and as a type of unrestricted warfare which put American leadership in the same class with Genghis Khan and which "cannot lead anywhere save to eventual disaster." There is also a rather irrelevant discussion of American failures in the Philippines at the outbreak of the war.

The great mistake of the book itself is its brevity. Mr. Baldwin repeats well-known propositions and gives reasonably good summary support to most of them. But the evidence and reasoning is so sketchy that he will convince only those initially disposed to agree. In some cases the argument is not clear. What principles ought to govern (or forbid) the use of the A-bomb? The author denounces and asserts, but leaves confusion. Why did Roosevelt champion the idea of unconditional surrender? Certainly not because of a desire "to win—period." The explanation that he did it to reassure Stalin that "there would be no compromise with Hitler" is hardly consistent with the fact that Stalin himself disapproved. Later explanations in terms of Roosevelt's war philosophy and of his "predilection for intuitive decisions and personalized policies" do not resolve the issue. What was "the basic fallacy"? Was it the desire simply to win militarily? Actually Roosevelt is shown to have given great emphasis to a desire to win politically, only he acted on the basis of wrong assumptions concerning post-war Soviet policy. Faulty intelligence work, or failure to utilize its results, was perhaps basic to the errors. It is useful to catalog errors, but it would be more useful to show why they were made and how similar ones can in the future be avoided.

State University of Iowa

Vernon Van Dyke

FRED W. RIGGS: *Pressures on Congress: A Study of the Repeal of Chinese Exclusion*. (New York: King's Crown Press, Columbia University, 1950, Pp., 260, \$3.75.)

This compact little volume provides a brief but revealing and analytical case study of the various forces and pressures which in 1943 culminated in the repeal of the Chinese exclusion acts. While the author has carefully examined the techniques, methods, and motivations of pressure groups in general, he reserves his most penetrating analysis for the particular type which he characterizes as a "catalytic group"—in this instance the Citizens Committee to Repeal Chinese Exclusion.

The role of such a group is graphically portrayed as the author describes in detail the methods by which the Citizens Committee coordinated the activities of various groups, such as the C. I. O., the Federal Council

of Churches, and others which favored repeal of the Chinese exclusion acts, and the techniques it utilized in winning the support of, or at least neutralizing organizations such as the American Legion, the A. F. of L., and the "Patriotic" Societies, which had traditionally favored exclusion.

Where national organizations were either indifferent or opposed to repeal, the Citizens Committee worked effectively to obtain support of important local or regional bodies of such groups. Thus, in 1943 the California department of the American Legion adopted a resolution urging repeal of the Chinese exclusion laws, despite the traditional stand of the national organization. Such a resolution, from a state which had long been a center of agitation for exclusion, undoubtedly exerted no little influence on the subsequent decision of the national executive committee of the Legion to approve a resolution supporting repeal. In a similar way, the support of David Dubinsky and the International Ladies Garment Workers Union for repeal indicated substantial internal opposition to the national policy of the A. F. of L.

In addition to the examination of such pressure groups and their impact upon legislation, the author presents an interesting study of the role of both Congressional (committees, regional blocs, etc.) and Administrative (the President, Immigration and Naturalization Service, and State Department) pressures in the movement for repeal of the Chinese exclusion laws.

There are excellent appendixes with pertinent excerpts from the Chinese exclusion laws and Presidential statements on the subject as well as a chronology of the legislative history of the repeal law. The notes and documentation reveal a wide range of sources; to this reviewer, perhaps as one of a small minority, the separation of text and footnotes is both awkward and somewhat distracting.

Mr. Riggs has provided an excellent work which will be helpful and informative to students of Chinese-American relations as well as to those whose primary interests lie in the areas of public opinion, pressure groups, and the legislative process.

San Francisco State College

Donald M. Castleberry

DAVID J. DALLIN: *The New Soviet Empire*. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1951, Pp. 216, \$3.75.)

WALDERMAR GURAIN (Ed.): *The Soviet Union: Background, Ideology, Reality*. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1951, Pp. 216, \$3.50.)

EDWARD E. PALMER (Ed.) *The Communist Problem in America*. (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Co., 1951, Pp. 496, \$2.50.)

The first two of the books listed above discuss various phases of the structure and policy of the USSR. The third book deals with the manifestation of Soviet influence in the USA, namely the American Communist Party.

Professor Dallin's work is an analysis of the dynamic which lies behind present day Soviet Imperialism. In seeking to evaluate the USSR as an Imperialist power the author searches for the root of Soviet expansionism in the traditional policies of Imperial Russia and shows how these have been nourished and enriched by the Marx-Lenin-Stalin dialectic. Of special interest is the author's behind the scenes description of the life of Soviet officials, his exposition of the operation of a free economy in the guise of a black market, his analysis of the evolution of a second generation Soviet elite, and his comments on the revival of great Russian nationalism. It is the author's conclusion that the destruction of the Soviet tyranny can be accomplished only with the cooperation of the Russian masses. Such cooperation can be attained only after the external defeat of Stalinism and the consequent destruction of the myth of its infallibility among the Russian masses.

The second work is a group of essays published under the auspices of the Committee of International Relations of Notre Dame University. Five essays in all are presented by scholars in the field of Russian history. A useful summary of the tactics of Russian Imperialism is afforded in Stephen Kertesz's article on the methods of Soviet Penetration in Eastern Europe. Of interest also is N. S. Timasheff's analysis of Religion in Russia 1941-50. Vladimir Petrov contributes some observations of the aims and methods of Soviet terrorism. The chief value of these articles and the others in the collection is that they afford convenient summaries of current information on various facets of the Russian picture. In all cases the authors are men distinguished in his field who speak with authority. In most instances, with the notable exception of Naum Jasny's discussion of the results of the Soviet Five Year Plans, the presentation is factual and the expression of the author's opinions and conclusions is for the most part eschewed.

Professor Palmer in his edited work entitled *The Communist Problem in America* has brought together a useful collection of readings on Communism as an ideology and as a political movement in the United States. In Part One the editor collects some of the representative statements of the Communist leaders from Marx to Vishinsky. In Part Two articles by Martin Ebon, Max Eastman and A. M. Schlesinger, Jr., lay the background for the party's development in the USA. Parts Three and Four deal with the various attempts at "informal" and "formal" i. e., legal, solutions of the Communist problem. A checklist of organizations and publications listed as Communist by various agencies of the government is appended to the text. The work as a whole gives a reasonably broad

and impartial coverage and should be useful in any course dealing with contemporary political theory or Communist activity in the USA.

The University of Texas

H. Malcolm Macdonald

GEORGE L. BIRD AND FREDERIC E. MERWIN (Eds.). *The Press and Society*. (New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1951, Pp. 655, \$5.00.)

This revision of *The Newspaper and Society*, by the same authors, follows closely the organization of the earlier (1924) work, but much new material has been introduced in each of the twenty-seven chapters. Statistics have been revised and findings of significant post-war studies are presented. This amounts to a considerable broadening of scope, although the principal focus is still on the newspaper. Shifts in newspaper competition are reflected in the book's increased attention to television, FM radio, advertising, propaganda, and syndication. Organization of labor groups in the industry is described.

The editors have retained under most subject headings some statements expressing points of view current a decade ago, "to preserve the historical depth of the book." But each chapter constitutes a symposium in which well-known writers present pros and cons of the subject. The result would be confusing but for the introductions in which the editors summarize each problem, raise questions, and narrow the issues. Even so, some readers who have only the social scientist's interest in the issues may find the book too much slanted, or too inconclusive, although in fairness they should appreciate the painstaking selection and presentation of source material.

The Newspaper and Society has been used in many journalism courses bearing the same name. It has been a helpful tool in teaching. The new edition will likely be no less useful if teachers are prepared to broaden the scope of their courses to include all aspects of expanding communications which affect newspapers. These "pro-newspaper" courses will not be contradicted in any damaging degree by *The Press and Society*. Editors Bird and Merwin state in their preface the belief that "recent studies of the press . . . show an increasing strength of the press as well as increased freedom." However, controversial issues, such as the increasing incidence of one-newspaper cities, are well developed.

Teachers will realize that it is left to them to lead students to rational attitudes on issues raised in the book. Other readers must weigh for themselves the viewpoints expressed. To accept any single article as the last word or whole truth in a problem would be to fail to realize the method and purpose of the book. Nor should any "outside" reader assume that, by studying these sources, he has an adequate grasp of newspapering. Newspapers have problems, of course, but newspapers also are people—reporters, editors, circulation managers, advertising men,

each of whom has serious problems related to, but little illuminated by a study of the newspaper in its broadest social and economic aspects.

The University of Texas

Olin E. Hinkle

SAMUEL HENDEL: *Charles Evans Hughes and the Supreme Court*. (New York: Kings Crown Press, Columbia University, 1951, Pp., 337, \$4.50.)

The judicial years of Charles Evans Hughes are difficult to analyze and evaluate both because he was Chief Justice of the United States throughout the critical 1930's and because of his long public career, which included an earlier period as Associate Justice, and other important offices. Furthermore, as the author states in his preface, "Mr. Hughes was both extolled as a great liberal and a fearless champion of public rights against special privileges, and denounced as a deadly conservative and the greatest champion of property rights of our time." Except for three short chapters on the non-judicial phases of his life, this work is confined to a discussion of the important decisions of the Court while Mr. Justice Hughes was one of its members. The remaining chapters provide a series of brief summaries of the chief opinions written by Mr. Justice Hughes, arranged according to the constitutional problem involved.

Mr. Hughes emerges as a Justice with moderately liberal views—especially in the field of civil liberties—but a liberal whose decisions could be characterized as limited. Because he relied heavily upon precedent, Hughes sometimes escaped meeting issues squarely or refused to overrule previous decisions, although the logic of his opinions called for it.

The author provides good summary statements of the major problems before the Court but sometimes fails to show the importance of the Hughes' opinions in dealing with these problems, or to make a really critical analysis of these opinions. Particularly during the period of his Chief Justiceship, the author deals with the "Hughes Court" without clarifying the role of the Chief Justice. Surely Chief Justice Hughes was more important than his opinions.

This is essentially a defense of the work of Mr. Justice Hughes. Yet in a final chapter, Mr. Hendel discusses the practice of judicial review in highly critical terms suggesting that he has little sympathy with the Chief Justice's firm faith in the importance of judicial review in a democratic political society.

Williams College

Delavan Evans

LAURA THOMPSON: *Culture in Crisis; A Study of the Hopi Indians*. (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1950, Pp., 221, \$4.00.)

This book of attractive appearance is more than just another description of the life and culture of an American Indian tribe. It is essentially a

report on an experiment in applied social research—a study of practical problems relevant to the administration of the Hopi Indians of Arizona. A product of the Indian Personality and Administration Research, Institute of Ethnic Affairs, an organization sponsored by the Office of Indian Affairs and the University of Chicago Committee on Human Development succeeded later by the Society for Applied Anthropology, *Culture in Crisis* sums up the results of an ambitious study participated in by specialists from a number of disciplines. Social and cultural anthropologists, psychiatrists, psychologists as well as experts in the fields of public administration, pedagogy, linguistics, and ecology cooperated in gathering and analyzing the data and developing a methodology.

The Hopi, an isolated tribe of less than 4,000 Pueblo Indians, are in the grip of a serious and far-reaching crisis. The roots of this crucial situation go back four centuries to their first contact with the Spaniards, but it has assumed more acute proportions in recent years due to increasing white pressure. The setting for the crisis, the complex and highly integrated Hopi way of life, is presented in detail by the author. The role of the individual is stressed throughout. A description of the native language and its relation to thought and behavior, taken from the writings of the late Benjamin Lee Whorf, rounds out the picture. Enough historical background is given to explain the forces which led to unbalance in this elaborate and delicately adjusted cultural structure. A series of axioms for federal officials charged with administering the Hopi and a summary of findings conclude the volume.

It is impossible in a short review to discuss fully the merits and faults of a book such as *Culture in Crisis* which is in many ways a pioneer work. Dr. Thompson succeeds in demonstrating what is generally recognized by social scientists—efficient administration of an essentially nonliterate people is dependent upon an understanding of their cultural background and personality traits and a utilization where possible of the traditional patterns of social organization and leadership. The book, however, is not easy to read as the presentation is hindered by the use of over-technical language and a complex and often abstruse terminology. Unnecessary and frequently tedious recapitulations further reduce its effectiveness. These stylistic weaknesses do not, of course, invalidate the study, but they do make things difficult for the reader.

University of Southern California

William J. Wallace

ALVIN H. HANSEN: *Business Cycles and National Income*. (New York: W. W. Norton and Co., Inc., 1951, Pp., 639, \$5.00.)

Teachers of business cycle theory have waited expectantly for this book. Other texts on the cycle did not quite meet the needs of the undergraduate course, either oversimplifying the theories, going too in-

tensively into the intricacies of alternative points of view, or presenting one explanation to the virtual exclusion of others. Mr. Hansen's earlier cycle text had done the jobs of cycle theory classification and presentations quite well. It was reasonable to expect that in his new cycle text he would add to theoretical nicety a fund of stimulating comment drawn from his extensive experiences with policy formation and research. His fluency had increased, also, and the new book would almost certainly be written in a lively and persuasive prose.

The book justifies some but not all of these anticipations. From the teacher's point of view it is a disconcerting mixture of excellence and inadequacy. The book starts very well with a vigorous preface which introduces the student to the differences between macro and micro-economics, and the relation of cycle theory to the former. The inclusion of a large section on the theory of income and employment, with a discussion of national income concepts, is welcome. This section summarizes effectively the savings-investment relations, the determinants of investment, the consumption function, the multiplier, and the principle of acceleration. Several of these also are reviewed in the succeeding section on cycle theories, but the considerable repetition may be appropriate for the student.

The theory descriptions are stimulating and generally well-written. The discussion of cycle theory chronology is quite good. Lauderdale, Malthus, and Hobson are given the attention and praise they deserve. The analyses of the contributions of Tugan-Baranowsky, Spiethoff, Wicksell, Fisher, and Aftalion are particularly noteworthy, and superior to treatments in other texts. Mr. Richard M. Goodwin's long chapter titled "Econometrics in Business Cycle Analysis," also should be mentioned as one of the superior portions of the theoretical section. It is an understandable presentation, much of which should be comprehensible to students with only limited mathematical training.

On the other hand, the presentations of the theories of Schumpeter, Cassel, and Hawtrey are somewhat incoherent. The section on Robertson is too brief for clarity, while that on Hayek reads well enough for someone familiar with Hayek's system, but will not be understood by the novice in cycle theories. The appendix on the Robertsonian and Swedish systems of period analysis should be expanded and included in the theoretical section. As it stands, it is not very useful.

The section on policy will prove an effective teaching tool. It provides a helpful chronological review of cycle policy, and a very satisfactory commentary on contemporary U. S. policy. Perhaps some will feel that European and Continental policy are neglected, but this is not too serious a fault in an American text.

Should Mr. Hansen revise his text, he might consider several modifications which would increase teachability. The "exogenous-endogenous"

classification, which he avoids, aids understanding despite sponsoring unwarranted segregation of some theories, and might be followed profitably. Part III, Business-Cycle Theory, should be amplified. Stating more clearly the salient content of each important theory would simplify the students' problem, and specific criticism of each theory would be appropriate. Several important commentators on the cycle who have been slighted or mentioned very casually—Veblen, Marx, Foster and Catchings, and others—might be given more attention in the broad survey of theory development. The discussion of secular trend could be strengthened by drawing on some of Mr. Hansen's excellent articles on the subject. Finally, some reorganization of the text might strengthen it. Part II, The Theory of Income and Employment, is difficult to place, but probably should follow rather than precede Part III, Business-Cycle Theory.

Notwithstanding these several criticisms, the book is a welcome addition to the limited shelf of cycle texts.

Southern Methodist University

Richard B. Johnson

FRANCIS E. MERRILL, H. WARREN DUNHAM, ARNOLD M. ROSE, AND PAUL W. TAPPAN: *Social Problems*. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1950, Pp., 425, \$3.00.)

There has probably been more dissatisfaction with the textbooks in the area of social problems and social disorganization than in any other field of sociological analysis. Despite the fact, perhaps because of the fact, that American sociology began largely as an exploration of social problems, research and writing in this field have had great difficulty in relating themselves to the main streams of social theory concerning social order and social change. Single factor theorizing and the confusion of multiple causation were dominant for many years. Yet beginning in the thirties it became apparent that a trend toward integration with the main body of sociological thinking was emerging. This book is part of that trend and represents a considerable advance.

Social problems are conceived by the authors to include "... (a) behavior on a large scale; (b) a social value believed to be threatened thereby; (c) a belief that the behavior and the value may (at least in theory) be reconciled by the purposive action of a democratic society." (p. 3). Such conceptualization places social problems squarely within the context of social organization and social structure, and the old dichotomy of social disorganization versus social problems loses much of its relevance. Not only is the relationship between values and deviant behavior placed within the social context, but so also is the action taken to resolve the problem. This latter is especially valuable as a framework within which the possibilities for actually resolving the problem can be determined.

The depth of analysis gained by such a frame of reference is extended by the concentration of the authors on four major problems, rather than the usual diffuse survey. Merrill treats family problems; Tappan, juvenile delinquency; Dunham, personality disorganization; and Rose, problems of minorities. The student should emerge from a reading of this text with a clear idea of the complexities involved in these particular problems, and an orientation that will aid him in approaching other problems.

Despite the merits of the framework employed certain critical qualifications must be entered. There are two major weaknesses, reflected primarily in Merrill's analysis of family problems, since he adheres most faithfully to the frame of reference, particularly at the points at which it is weakest. First, there is the question whether in interpreting social problems within a broad context it should be done with the primary reference made to social change, rather than concentrating first on a functional analysis. Merrill seems to believe that social problems of the family occur because of a cultural lag between the development of family values and the changes of its functions in recent history. This implies that the family, with its remaining functions can be adapted to the demands placed upon it by its position in the social structure. Functional analysis might raise the question as to whether the family can perform its functions in view of its tight articulation into the occupational system and the system of social stratification. It is conceivable that the family is in difficulty because of the incompatibility of its socializing, democratizing, and affectional functions with those imposed by the demands of the broader institutional structure. This is not a matter of cultural lag, but of institutional malintegration, because both sets of functions are contemporary, not historical.

The second weakness stems from the emphasis upon a shared consciousness of the problem and of the possibilities of remedial action. It is doubtful whether the sociologist should restrict his conception of social problems to areas where there is already a consciousness of them. Thus if he sees that certain functional stresses and strains are creating behavior that threaten the basic values of our society, he should point them out and bring them to consciousness on the part of the members of the society. Further, in analyzing the possibilities of action he may find it necessary to indicate, as Tappan has done in several instances, that action to correct the social problem is first dependent on the ability to change the matrix from which the reform action is emerging, or is to emerge.

Despite these qualifications, this book remains a good introduction to social problems. The authors are to be congratulated not only on setting up a frame of reference which relates social problems to our society, but

also on actually using it in the exploration of social problem data and the interpretation of research.

Tulane University

William L. Kolb

L. ETHAN ELLIS: *A Short History of American Diplomacy*. (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1951, Pp., 604, \$5.00.)

To write a new, worthwhile textbook in a field so well stocked as American diplomatic history requires courage, ability and originality. Professor Ellis, fortunately, possesses all three qualities. Aiming at the one-semester course, he has compressed the entire story from pre-Revolutionary days to 1949 in 549 pages. Since the latest editions of Bemis and Bailey occupy 943 and 908 pages of text respectively, the job of condensation is impressive.

The organization is both chronological and topical. A brief chapter on "The Problem of Diplomacy" is followed by ones on the colonial era, the Revolution, the Confederation (mostly a discussion of the conduct of foreign relations under the new constitution), and two on the new republic in the world scene, 1789-1815. Continental expansion, the Monroe Doctrine through 1940, and relations with Mexico since 1846 come next. The ubiquitous British problem from 1815-1903 is then disposed of in two installments, one dealing with fisheries and boundaries, the other with the Civil War and Isthmian rivalries. Overseas expansion at the end of the century marks the half-way point in the volume.

The remaining eight chapters out of the 20 are concerned with advance and retreat in the Caribbean, China from the 1790s to 1943, Japan from the 1850s to 1932, the Great Crusade and the separate peace, a decade of contradictions (1922-1933), the descent into isolationism, the Second World War, and the events after 1945. Fifteen maps, informative footnotes, a selective bibliography and a clear style promise to make this a teachable book.

As the author admits, no two readers will agree with the omissions demanded by brevity; and, as in all textbooks, specialists will spot mistakes that deserve burial, not repetition. This reviewer's quarrel, however, is not with Professor Ellis' commendable performance but with the need that called it forth. To survey adequately all American diplomacy in one semester is virtually impossible, for scholars are now broadening the subject by more attention to domestic forces—social, political, constitutional and strategic. This first-rate book will, regrettably, encourage colleges to condense where they should expand.

Northwestern University

Richard W. Leopold

JOHN H. ROHRER AND MUZAHER SHERIF (Ed.): *Social Psychology at the Crossroads*. (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1951, Pp. 437, \$4.00.)

EDWIN M. LEMERT: *Social Pathology*. (New York: McGraw-Hill Publishing Co., 1951, Pp. 459, \$4.50.)

Social Psychology at the Crossroads, edited by J. H. Rohrer and M. Sherif, is a critical appraisal of the attempts of social psychology to establish itself as a much needed scientific discipline. The aim of the book seems to be to establish a more definite theoretical framework for social psychology or more specifically to reformulate objectives and consider both theoretical and methodological problems involved in attaining the objectives.

The papers which constitute the volume were presented at a conference sponsored by the University of Oklahoma and held on its campus April 6-11, 1950. The purpose of the conference was to enable research workers in biology, sociology, and other social sciences to see how findings in related areas might be synthesized by viewing them in a common perspective, by comparing notes, and by considering together the implications of the results of each finding in relation to others.

To present a unified scheme of social psychology, representative topics on biological, psychological, and socio-cultural levels were chosen. Muzafer Sherif does a difficult but invaluable job of integrating the papers in a twenty page introduction.

The volume is surprisingly inclusive and is quite different from other books coming out of conferences in that the articles are fitted into an effective theoretical framework. The book will undoubtedly be well received by teachers and researchers not only in social psychology but in related disciplines. It should be required reading for graduate students in social psychology to insure their receiving a broad theoretical and methodological orientation.

Social Pathology, by Edwin M. Lemert, is composed of two closely related parts. Part One is devoted to the development of a systematic theory for the analysis of sociopathic behavior. The author presents his theory, breaks it down into seven carefully developed postulates, and then proceeds to further refine and develop his theory in three well organized chapters.

The stated objective of the work is "to study a limited part of deviation in human behavior and a certain range of societal reactions, together with their interactional products, and by the same methods of science to arrive at generalizations about the uniformities in these events."

The author carefully analyzes the terms deviation and differentiation, the societal reaction to socially visible deviations, and the process of

sociopathic individuation in terms of all the factors which tend to differentiate either individuals or groups.

Part Two, entitled "Deviation and Deviants", deals with the systematic application of the theory to seven types of sociopathic behavior. In the analysis of each type of behavior the writer deals with the nature and extent of the deviation, the societal reaction to the deviation, and the problem of adjustment for individuals so individuated. His analyses of the various areas, being systematized and couched within a carefully developed theory, are far superior to other analyses in the same areas.

Students using the book as a basic text should make case-history studies of deviants in order to comprehend more fully the theoretical ideas in the book. An outline for case-history studies is presented in the Appendix.

The volume should be well received both from the standpoint of content and methodology. Individuals aspiring to add to the scientific literature in the field would do well to study Lemert's approach to research.

A. & M. College of Texas

Bardin H. Nelson

NORMAN WARD: *The Canadian House of Commons*. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1950, Pp., 307, \$6.00.)

American students of legislative procedure and organization for years bewailed the lack of comparative data within their special fields. Not only has this need been felt at the upper levels of governments, but particularly has it been true at the dominion, state, and provincial levels. Generalizations made upon a sparse amount of data, and founded upon sporadic analyses were in most instances to be taken with the proverbial grain of salt by the chary political scientist or sociologist.

Now there has been added to the literature of the field a significant new volume upon the Canadian House of Commons. The author is Norman Ward of the University of Saskatchewan. *The Canadian House of Commons* as a volume in the Canadian Political Science Series makes a distinct contribution and further indicates that the study of political science has come of age in Canada.

Well written, the work is devoted to a consideration, fundamental in character, of representation at the Dominion level in Canada. There are four chief parts in this book: the nature of representation; the constituencies; the members of Parliament; and elections. A concluding summary and several appendices constitute the remaining portions of the work. Tables of pertinent data and statistics are presented throughout the volume serving greatly to illuminate and support the textual presentations.

The American reader will find a wealth of basic information within this volume about a branch of the Canadian Parliament. Indeed many

otherwise familiar legislative problems will appear in new guises. The account of the chronic problem of re-distribution or apportionment of the seats in the Canadian House of Commons and the concomitant dilemma of re-districting will seem capable of having been borrowed from the legislative patterns and annals of almost any American state. Similar parallels spring forth from many pages, and set the reader speculating comparatively upon the suggested implications.

Professor Ward has given us a lucid analysis of the basic problem of representation in this study of the Canadian House of Commons. In every way it is a thorough work, deserving of much use and respect by students of comparative government and legislative organization and procedure. Both the author and the publisher have placed political science in their debt.

Wayne University

Charles W. Shull

F. S. C. NORTHROP, HENRY MARGENAU, AND OTHERS: *The Nature of Concepts: Their Interrelation and Role in Social Structure*. (Stillwater: Oklahoma A. and M. College and Foundation for Integrated Education, 1951, Pp., 134, N. P.)

This series of papers perpetuates the grist of the four day conference on general education held in Stillwater in June, 1950. The general papers are presented with some annotation from forum periods and Northrop's summary. In this summary the author somewhat exuberantly exclaimed, "Never have I been in a conference in which there was so much agreement upon the part of speakers and questioners as has occurred in this one!" Be this as it may, there is considerable variation in the papers. Some are polite descriptive speeches (Claude Hawley, Kirtley Mather); some are briefs on genuine problems in the logic and language of science (Northrop, Margenau, Sherif), at least one is a polemic (Margenau's final note, "Remarks on Ethical Science"). The major paper left out of this classification, Kluckhohn's—the one social scientists might most anticipate—fits nowhere in particular. Kluckhohn, as befitting the occasion, took the position that there is necessity for a conceptual scheme cutting across traditional disciplines and that an emphasis upon structure and form in ideas as opposed to the content of raw empiricism is a desirable end, but he managed to end upon the highly original note: "It is my belief that anthropology can contribute specifically to this integrative problem . . ."

After hearing the papers and rereading them, the opinion is strong that what they contain will neither win converts or enlist opponents for the general education movement. What they might do is to provide a base for discussion in a given faculty distributed between generalists and disciplinary purists. Perhaps that's what the papers in this form are for.

If they do serve this end, it will be obvious that general education, too, has problems in integrating both concepts and ideas.

Oklahoma A. and M. College

Paul B. Foreman

GEORGE B. CRESSEY: *Asia's Lands and Peoples*. (Second Edition.) (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1951, Pp., 597, \$7.00.)

George Cressey's work on Asia needs no introduction. Here, printed for easy reading and extensively illustrated, is a second edition of his 1944 volume. New statistical material is included, maps and illustrations have been changed and the number increased, every section has been rewritten in the light of new information and recent developments, and chapters have been added to deal with the nations that have appeared since the end of the war.

It is hard to imagine a geographer being anything but satisfied with this as a course text, and it is a valuable supplement for history, government, or economic courses on the Far East. The typical geographical information is present: topography, minerals, communication routes, climate, rivers and mountains, etc. But Professor Cressey has included a great deal of first hand information about the people, their needs, their habits, and their ways of living. There is much here, too, about the spread of industrialization across Asia.

The book ranges from Turkey to the Philippines. It is all-inclusive, interesting, and extremely useful to anyone doing any work with the Asian area. There is only one complaint, which the publishers may consider unjustified: the price.

Canberra, Australia

James R. Roach

MURRAY S. STEDMAN, JR., AND SUSAN W. STEDMAN: *Discontent at the Polls*. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1950, Pp., 190, \$2.75.)

This book analyzes the functions of farmer-labor parties—"to popularize ideas and to act as vehicles of discontent." Its charts, graphs, and tables present useful historical, geographical, and economic data. The descriptive text presents a number of tentative conclusions and a few trite notions—that major parties steal popular programs from minor parties, that a major drop in business activity is accompanied by increased protest voting, that cities tend to be centers of labor discontent. The reader is informed that an obstacle to the organizing, promoting, and financing of minor parties is the strength of the two-party system. One might reflect that major parties actually satisfy some of the demands of farmers and laborers to the extent that the appeals of minor parties for votes and finances is thereby weakened.

The authors explain how some minor parties have been influential through balance-of-power techniques and how such parties have retained

their identity even when supporting successfully the candidate of a major party. Students may be grateful for the summary of legal barriers and for the variety of items on strategy and tactics.

Careful proof-reading should have corrected the word "constructed" for "construed" in reference to judicial review of a state statute. But for the most part the book is well edited. Election statistics and a chronology of farmer-labor party representation in Congress are given in two appendices. The 12-page index is excellent.

University of Richmond

Spencer Albright

RICHARD J. RUSSELL AND FREDERICK B. KNIFFEN: *Cultural Worlds*. (New York: Macmillan Co., 1951, Pp., 620, \$6.00.)

This book is dedicated to Carl Ortwin Sauer, "who pointed the way, established the guide posts, and directed many along the road to a better understanding of the central theme of geography," and is repeated by this reviewer for the benefit of the authors who have done so much in the field of geography in making it a dynamic art of great value to mankind.

The first chapter, "Culture Worlds," reflects such scholarly treatment of the whole field of geography that time would be well spent in memorizing it by students who are looking for guide posts in their geographic research endeavors, whether that research be in the library or the field.

The book is divided as follows: Polar World, Europe, Eastern Europe, Mediterranean Realm, Chinese Realm, Malayan Realm, Indo-Chinese Shatter Belt, American World, Anglo-American Realm, and Latin American Realm. Although the book is essentially regional, the skill of the authors prevents any confusion with political realms and spheres of influence. As an aid to further reading, a bibliography is included.

Ordinarily, it is very difficult to present a central composite theme of such diverse subjects as historical geography, physical geography, and economic geography, but the essential elements of these sciences have been blended in a manner to produce maximum ease in reading.

This reviewer was happy to find the complete absence of repetitious conformity to patterns which some authors employ in order to achieve chapter uniformity. The handling of each chapter has been done with enough variance so that each chapter becomes a new reading experience.

Physiography and climatology are injected in a lusty narrative manner and this greatly reduces the necessity of statistical tables. Imposing statistical tables, no matter how harmless they may be, have a way of frightening students.

Carl Ortwin Sauer has remarked about the beautiful style of writing in *Culture Worlds*. The book, which would delight the most critical English department, is proof that beautiful writing and "easy-chair" reading are entirely compatible. The type and general arrangement of the book are reflections of printing excellence.

Loyola University of New Orleans

Alexander Warrington

Other Books Received

- Alyea, Paul E.: *Revenues of Small Alabama Cities*. (University, Alabama: Bureau of Business Research, 1951, Pp., 27, NP.)
- Burrus, John N.: *Life Opportunities*. (University, Mississippi: Bureau of Public Administration, 1951, Pp., 58, NP.)
- Commonwealth of Kentucky: *Education: The Current Situation*. (Frankfort, Kentucky: State of Kentucky, 1951, Pp., 39, NP.)
- Dahl, Robert A. and Brown, Ralph S.: *Domestic Control of Atomic Energy*. (New York: Social Science Research Council, 1951, Pp., 117, \$1.00.)
- Davenport, R. W. and *Fortune* Editors: *U. S. A. The Permanent Revolution*. (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1951, Pp., 267, \$1.50.)
- Dimock, Marshall E. and others: *La Reorganizacion de la Rama Ejecutiva*. (University of Puerto Rico, School of Public Administration, 1951, Pp., 174, NP.)
- Einaudi, Mario, Domenach, J. M., and Garosci, Aldo: *Communism in Western Europe*. (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1951, Pp., 239, \$3.00.)
- Ellis, Kenneth and others: *Intelligence and Cultural Differences*. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951, Pp., 388, \$5.00)
- Firth, Raymond: *Elements of Social Organization*. (New York: Philosophical Library, 1951, Pp., 257, \$5.75.)
- Frank, John P.: *Cases on the Constitution*. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1951, Pp., 339, \$3.50.)
- Griffin, Clare E.: *An Economic Approach to Antitrust Problems*. (New York: American Enterprise Association, 1951, Pp., 95, \$1.00.)
- Hallenbeck, W. C.: *American Urban Communities*. (New York: Harper and Bros., 1951, Pp., 617, \$6.00.)
- Havinghurst, Robert J. and others: *The American Veteran Back Home*. (New York: Longmans, Green, Co., 1951, Pp., 271, \$3.50.)
- Heberle, Rudolf and Hall, D. S.: *New Americans*. (Baton Rouge, Louisiana: Displaced Persons Commission, 1951, Pp., 93, NP.)
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News Notes

The 1952 annual convention of the Southwestern Social Science Association will be held in Dallas on Friday and Saturday, April 11 and 12. Convention headquarters will be at the Baker Hotel. President Vernon G. Sorrell has announced a meeting of the Executive Committee on Thursday evening, April 10. At the general Association meeting on Friday evening, April 11, Professor John Ise, the economist, will be the guest speaker, and President Sorrell will give the presidential address.

Professor Ralph L. Edgel, General Program Chairman, has asked the help of section chairmen and members involved in the several section programs in completing final arrangements on schedule. In order to work out all details as completely as possible, he suggests that those concerned keep the following deadlines in mind:

January 15, 1952: Decisions of sections regarding luncheon meetings, joint meetings, and other matters which affect space reservations. Tentative program in hands of General Program Chairman.

February 1, 1952: Tentative program mimeographed.

February 1-15, 1952: Tentative program mailed to membership and final program prepared for printing.

March 15, 1952: Copies of all papers and outlines of panel programs should be in the hands of the General Program Chairman in order that he may obtain accurate advance publicity and reporting for the meetings.

Dean George T. Walker, Secretary-Treasurer of the Association, has compiled a membership list which has been mailed to all members. This affords an excellent opportunity for cooperation with the individual membership committee. By reference to the list, each member will be able to invite associates not now affiliated with the Association to join and thus to expand the representation of his department or institution in the Association's work.

The Department of Accounting of the University of Texas announces the appointment of two new staff members in rank of assistant professor. They are Jim G. Ashburne and Glenn A. Welsch, both of whom hold the M.B.A. from Oklahoma A&M College.

The College of Business Administration of the University of Texas held its first annual reunion of alumni on October 5 and 6, 1951. This conference was attended by some 350 alumni.

The Department of Economics of the University of Texas announces the appointment of the following new staff members, all in rank of assistant professor: Harold A. Shapiro, formerly of the Office of Price

Administration in Houston; Murray E. Polakoff; and Leon Lee, on leave for the 1951-52 academic year from the University of Oklahoma. Dr. Eastin Nelson, of the department, has been promoted to the rank of professor of economics. Two members of the department have been awarded grants for special study during the present academic year. Professor Leonard A. Lecht is doing work in New York under a Ford Foundation grant and Professor Frank R. Varon is studying in France under a Fulbright award.

The Department of Sociology and Anthropology, Tulane University, has inaugurated a program leading to the Ph.D. degree in sociology, commencing with the year 1951-52. Social organization is the major area of concentration, supported by emphases in social psychology and race relations; urbanism and urbanization will provide the unifying theme for the new program. University fellowships are available, as are a limited number of departmental research assistantships ranging in value from \$1000 to \$1500 annually, plus tuition. Further information may be obtained from the Tulane Graduate School.

With the departure of Logan Wilson to become academic vice-president of the University of North Carolina, the department is being run by an executive committee composed of Forrest E. LaViolette, William L. Kolb, and Robert Wauchope.

Closely integrated with academic work is the new Urban Life Research Institute of which John H. Rohrer is director. Five members of the department are participating in its research activities: Munro Edmonson, Roy G. Francis, Harlan Gilmore, Robert Lystad and Robert C. Stone. The Institute also offers several research assistantships. Projects under way are concerned with the social structure of the work situation, levels of aspiration and promotion, worker mobility, and research methodology.

Dorrian Apple is on leave of absence at Harvard, where she is taking her residence work toward the Ph.D. in sociology. W. L. Kolb has been promoted to the rank of Professor; he has completed a portion of his study of values and social theory. A new member of the staff is Leonard Reissman, who took his graduate work at Princeton and Northwestern. Arden R. King is studying the complex social and cultural situation and the concept of status personality in Coban, Alta Verapaz, Guatemala. Warren Breed is studying newspaper control analysis as his dissertation subject for a degree from Columbia University.

The Middle American Research Institute has completed Volume I of *Middle American Research Records*, consisting of 16 monographs. Among them are "A Recent Attempt at Educational Cooperation Between the United States and Guatamala," by William J. Griffiths; "Aspects of Land

Tenure and Economics in a Mexican Village," by Oscar Lewis; and "A Tentative Sequence of Pre-Classic Ceramics in Middle America," by Robert Wauchope. Also published this year by the Institute is *The Culture of Security in San Carlos*, by John Gillin. The Latin-American Area Studies Program offered a seven and one-half week summer field school in Guatemala. The faculty was composed of William J. Griffith (history); Arden R. King (anthropology); Frank L. Keller (human geography); and Kalman H. Silvert (political science) all of Tulane; and Paul Kirchoff (protohistoric ethnology), of the University of Washington.

After serving as lecturer for one year in the University of Puerto Rico College of Agriculture, W. R. Morrison returns to the University of Arkansas as instructor in the College of Agriculture, Department of Rural Economics and Sociology. He will engage in research in the marketing of farm products. Vance W. Edmondson has been appointed assistant professor in the same department. After receiving the M.S. degree from Oklahoma A. and M. College, he studied for one year in the Royal College of Agriculture, Copenhagen, Denmark. Hillard Jackson returns to the department as assistant professor following doctoral study at North Carolina State College. William J. Windham has been appointed instructor. His present research project is the analysis of the egg hatching industry in the state.

Carl Backman has been appointed instructor of sociology at the University of Arkansas. Mr. Backman comes to Arkansas from Indiana University. Besides teaching sociology Mr. Backman is teaching a first year basic course in social science which is also taught by members from other social science departments.